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THE 13TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION (EPW) DURING MOBILIZATION, DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM AND DEMOBILIZATION

BY

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From January 23, 1988 to August 23, 1991, I commanded the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War-EPW) headquartered at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. My unit was the only Reserve psychological operations battalion (POB) activated for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The purpose of this paper is to describe my personal experiences as commander of the 13th Battalion from activation to demobilization, and record the events which occurred during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. My motivation is to ensure that the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion and its unique capability of EPW psychological (Psyop) support be retained in the force structure.

Pre-testing and post-testing of psyop products on EPW along with procurement of psyop relevant information from the prisoners was an important wartime function performed by the 13th Battalion. An equally important wartime mission was acting as a force multiplier for the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade (EPW). Numerous disturbances within the EPW camps were defused by direct intervention of 13th Battalion psyop camp teams with back-pack loudspeakers.

Advising the M.P. commanders on psychological control measures for use on EPW prevented any serious incidents between the American guards and the Iraqi EPW.

Operation Desert Storm revalidated the 13th Psyop Battalion's mission of providing direct support psyop to M.P. EPW camp operations, and pre-testing and post-testing of psyop material.

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THE 13th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION (EPW) DURING MOBILIZATION, DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM AND DEMOBILIZATION

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

by

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PRE-MOBILIZATION

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions and Special Forces units invaded the small, oil-rich country of Kuwait. This single event captured world-wide attention and resulted in a war with Iraq involving the United States as part of a coalition force. In support of the effort to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, a large force of Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve soldiers was activated and deployed to the Gulf region. The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (POB), Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) was one of those units.

At 0400 hours August 6, 1990, four days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a change of command ceremony was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for the departing 6th Psyop Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Devlon. Immediately after conclusion of the brief ceremony selected elements of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) began to deploy to Saudi Arabia. Planning for an extended psychological operations campaign directed at the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait began in earnest.

As the Commander of the Army Reserve 1 h POB (EPW), I was at Fort Bragg for the purpose of attending the 6th Battalion's change of command. I had been the Battalion Commander of the 13th POB since Jan. of 1988, and had established a unique training affiliation with the active Army 6th POB.

During my stay at Fort Bragg, I had the opportunity to confer with a number of 4th POG staff officers concerning the situation in Southwest Asia, and how my battalion could

contribute to the Psyop mission if activated. As the only Psyop battalion with a prisoner of war mission, this unique asset was highly valued by the psyop community. Some of the staff of the newly formed United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACA/POC), along with members of the 4th POG, suggested that I prepare my battalion for eventual activation. USACA/POC was scheduled to become our peacetime higher headquarters sometime in the near future. At that time USACA/POC was working training and organizational issues only, for conversion to the Living Table of Organization and Equipment (LTOE) for Psyop and Civil Affairs units. The 86th ARCOM in Arlington Heights, Illinois, was to remain our peacetime higher headquarters until such time as USACA/POC was capable of this realignment.

Upon return to Fort Snelling, Minnesota, the battalion staff and I began planning actions for possible mobilization. In July 1990, the 13th Battalion completed a highly successful annual training at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, in support of the 800th MP Brigade (Sep.) (EPW). The battalion's ratings and evaluations, conducted independently by the 86th ARCOM and 4th POG, showed that the battalion was in a superior state of readiness, and with the exception of some missing or outdated equipment, could be mobilized immediately. A study of the previous Unit Status Report (USR) also led to the conclusion that the unit was prepared for mobilization in qualified and trained personnel. However, obsolete equipment and shortages of critical items led

me to conclude that the battalion would be hampered in performing its wartime mission. Old speaker systems were difficult to maintain and in short supply. The single Mobile System Quadriphonic (MSQ-85) Psyop Support vehicle was outdated and spare parts were no longer available.

NEW EQUIPMENT

Through contacts established with 4th POG at Fort Bragg, the Battalion S-4 discovered that new backpack Light Speaker System (LSS-40) and Audio-visual/Mobile System Quadriphonic 85B (AN/MSQ-85B) vans were in production and could be expected to fill equipment needs in selected Reserve Psyop units, starting with the new fiscal year.

True to 4th P.O.G.'s word, the 13th Battalion began receiving new equipment in October and November. Accompanying the AN/MSQ-85B psyop support vehicle to Fort Snelling, was a civilian training team supplied by the producing manufacturer. Five reserve soldiers were trained on this state of the art audio-visual equipment and on the unique characteristics of the vehicle. Upon departure of the training team, the AN/MSQ-85B certified individuals conducted training classes for additional soldiers. Incorporated with the vehicle were new LSS-40 speaker systems, resolving partially our dilemma of attempting to operate our old speaker sets. Fortunately, prior to deployment to Saudi Arabia, the battalion was able to hand receipt additional LSS-40 speakers from nondeploying psyop units.

As an additional upgrade, in November we received a factory new modular printing system. This welcome news came as a complete surprise, as a new medium print system was procured less than 2 years earlier. The modular printing system consists of four large semitrailers with accompanying prime movers, four 5K trailer-mounted generators and four 5-ton trucks with bed-mounted pods. The four printing presses and all accompanying support equipment came as a complete mobile package that was air transportable. The Battalion S-3 requested and received from 4th POG a training team for the new modular print package. Because of training space limitations, only fifteen reserve soldiers were trained during a 2-week period in early December. These trained soldiers then conducted training for the remaining untrained Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) soldiers.

Another possible indicator of imminent mobilization for the battalion was the receipt of large quantities of new Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) equipment, and additional Chemical Protective Over Garments (CPOGs) along with clothing and CTA-50 items unique to SOF units.

MTOE to LTOE

During the 4-month time frame of August through November of 1990 all psychological operations units were in transition, switching from their current Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) configuration to a Living Table of Organization and Equipment (LTOE). Personnel and equipment were being added

or deleted along with mission changes and realignments. Concomitant with preparations for mobilization, the conversion to the new LTOE added confusion and stress to the situation for the battalion staff and soldiers in general. Adding further confusion to the situation was the deactivation of the other Psyop battalion at Fort Snelling, the 360th. My battalion was tasked with deactivating the 360th Battalion, forming a new 349th Psyop Research and Development Company, absorbing whatever excess equipment and personnel were left and retraining individuals whose MOSs were eliminated. On 15 Nov. 1990, this newly activated Psyop Co. became another peacetime administratively subordinate company of my battalion.

ARABIC LINGUISTS

The original Capstone mission of the 13th Psyop Battalion (EPW) was to support the prisoner of war effort and psyop campaign in the European theater. Thus the linguists were trained in, and focused on, Soviet and Warsaw Pact languages. A search of the ARPERCEN data base for Arabic language qualified soldiers within the Geographic area revealed only one, Warrant Officer David Juba. Trained at the Defense Language Institute 16 years previously, CW3 Juba would need an extensive refresher course to be recertified. Another soldier, Sergeant Mark Felton, was qualified in Persian Farci (Iranian). Both soldiers belonged to the deactivating 360th POB and were easily convinced to accept a position in the 13th POB, and with very little prompting,

volunteered to attend a 1-month language refresher course in their respective languages. Orders were quickly produced transferring the individuals and assigning them to the Special Forces conducted language school at Fort Bragg. Both individuals later deployed with the battalion to Saudi Arabia, and proved to be tremendous assets during the war.

PREPARATION FOR SOF VALIDATION

For several months, a rumor was circulating within the reserve forces of a mandatory Special Operations Forces (SOF) validation test. The rumor reputed that each SOF soldier must pass a rigorous mental and physical test in order to continue as a member of a SOF unit.

Like most rumors, I chose to ignore this one until such time as an official verifying message or directive was received through the chain of command. The rumor was enhanced with each passing week, until, much to my consternation, an official message was received, verifying it. Not only was the rumor true, but added to the official message was the caveat that no SOF soldier would be deployed OCONUS unless he/she had been validated within the last 6 months. Otherwise, they would have to be revalidated. The task of motivating the primarily intellectual psyop soldiers to pass a rigorous Physical Training (P.T.) test to SOF standard seemed insurmountable to me. However, with the philosophy of leading from the front, I set about the task of upgrading my personal physical condition immediately.

The SOF Validation Test consisted of:

1. Attaining as a minimum a 70 percentile in each category of the standard Army P.T. test.
2. Completing a timed, 2-hour, 10-kilometer march with weapon, full combat gear and 55 lbs of additional weight in the rucksack.
3. Completing a 4-hour, 10 kilometer, timed land navigation course with full combat gear and 55 lbs. in the rucksack.
4. A swimming test with boots and Battle Dress Uniform (BDU).
5. A written MOS test with a minimum score of 90 percent.
6. A Civil Affairs (CA)/Psyop Leader's Test and Common Skills Test with 90 percent minimum standard.

A plan had to be devised quickly in order to assure validation of the battalion in the shortest possible time frame. The Battalion S-4 and Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) commander were directed to procure and issue all supporting equipment which the soldiers would need to train for the validation test. Each soldier would hand receipt all necessary equipment, and be responsible for its maintenance, and its availability during weekend drills. The battalion supply sergeant and HHC commander protested this action for reasons of accountability and potential loss of equipment. For years, ARCOM policy had been to store all CTA-50 items at the unit armories, and only issue what was necessary for training. Retrieval of the

CTA-50 gear would be accomplished at the end of each drill. This ARCOM policy eliminated the greater portion of equipment losses, but was not conducive to sound training in preparation for mobilization, with weapons and sensitive items being the exception.

In preparation for the 10K timed march, each soldier was issued all CTA-50 items and the mandatory rucksack. Fifty-five pounds of weight was supplied in the form of carefully weighted sandbags. However, many of the soldiers preferred to use personal bar bells for weight. Each drill, the battalion issued M-16 rifles, weighted the rucksacks and started the training day with the 10K timed march. Soldiers were encouraged to train vigorously during the month on their personal time also. For added convenience of the reservists, the full-time support staff was directed to be available at established times during the week, for physical training of any soldier wishing to do additional physical training at the Reserve Center. Over half of the Reservists took advantage of this opportunity to enhance their physical stamina.

With an influx of new personnel from disbanded units, the addition of another subordinate company, arrival of new equipment, and the LTOE reorganization, the battalion continued in its preparation for a possible mobilization. Individual training focused on MOS enhancement, Common Task Training (CTT) and SOF validation. Team training concentrated on prisoner of

war psychological operations, interrogation techniques and related force multiplier support to military police operations.

DERIVATIVE UIC

The 13th Psychological Operations Battalion was directed to brief the USACA/POC commander, Brigadie General Joseph Hurteau in November 1990. The briefing would be given in Columbia, S.C. at the 360th Civil Affairs Command Headquarters. The briefing was to focus on the battalion's plan to perform its wartime mission in support of five enemy prisoner of war camps if deployed to Saudi Arabia. The caveat, however, was that the battalion had to plan for a derivative Unit Identification Code (U.I.C), with a force of no more than 32 soldiers and related vehicles and equipment. This was shocking news for the battalion, as our organization and training focused around psyop camp teams each consisting of 12-15 soldiers. Supporting the camp teams are the research and development section, the large printing/audiovisual section and the battalion's illustrators. The HHC performed the normal functions common to all HHC's. Obviously, pertinent questions needed to be addressed, such as who would perform the necessary equipment maintenance and messing, along with all the other psyop functions of print and A.V. support. My thoughts at this time were that the United States had reached the 200,000 Reserve cap, and that was the reason we were being severely limited in deployable soldiers.

The briefing to General Hurteau outlined my plan for reducing the camp teams to five soldiers each and retaining a staff of seven. including myself. Only trained interrogators who were psyop qualified would be in the team structure. The staff would consist of the Battalion C.O., Battalion SGT Major, Battalion S-3, Operations NCO, Battalion S-2, and two liaison officers. All of the staff members would have dual or triple-hatted functions.

Because the 13th POB would be deployed, if mobilized, in a Moslem culture and be dealing directly with captured Moslem male prisoners, the unit was instructed not to include female psyop soldiers on the camp teams. Therefore, the battalion transferred a number of well-trained and capable female soldiers out of the camp teams and replaced them with males. This delicate situation was not popular with, but was accepted without incident by the female soldiers involved.

At home station, under the supervision of the Battalion X.O., Major Ron Morss, would remain the print and audiovisual teams, additional interrogators, linguists, research and development, and support personnel. Our thoughts at the time were that as soon as Congress lifted the restrictions of the 200K Reserve call-up, the remaining personnel would join the deployed portion of the battalion in Saudi Arabia. This thought helped lessen the impact on those soldiers not selected for activation. The hope of the remaining battalion being activated and joining the derivative U.I. C. in Saudi Arabia was never to materialize.

Having briefed my plans for a derivative UIC to General Hurteau, I was told to prepare for possible mobilization in the proposed configuration. I still, however, had nothing in writing, and no formal verbal order to show that the 13th Battalion was to be mobilized, or when. With the uncertainty of "if or when" for mobilization, my plan for continued preparation in anticipation of the eventuality, consisted of identifying 60 selected individuals for a 2-week, home station, annual training (A.T.) starting on 17 December 1990. We were not to complete the A.T. prior to activation.

During the A.T. time frame, SOF P.T. would intensify along with C.T.T. and M.O.S. training. Vehicles and equipment listed on the derivative UIC would be prepared by maintenance teams for OCONUS shipment and CONEX containers located and hand receipted to the battalion. Civilian shipping contracts were reviewed and modified to comply with the new equipment load list.

ACTIVATION - HOME STATION

Our annual training was terminated prematurely, however, when on 23 December 1990, a telephonic message, preceded by a coded statement, was received. The 13th Psyop Battalion was to be activated on 25 December. My reaction to this message was to reply with an emphatic "No, not on Christmas Day." My reply caused great consternation back up the chain of command. However, my point was made and accepted by USACA/POC. A revised message was secure faxed back to the battalion within the hour,

changing the date to reflect 27 December as our activation day. Our mobilization site reporting date at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was 1 January 1991 (Appendix A).

The hectic days following activation were consumed with legal briefings, will writing, notifying civilian employers, family support briefings, the loading of supplies and equipment and a myriad of other actions. The unit's vehicles and equipment left Fort Snelling by commercial carrier on 29 December. Our advance party of five activated soldiers along with two logistics/supply reservists on A.T. status, departed by commercial aircraft for the mobilization site that same day. The main body flew from the Minneapolis International Airport to Fort Bragg on the afternoon of 31 December (Appendix B).

FACING THE MEDIA

86th ARCOM and USACA/POC policy is that all media queries regarding psychological operations units must be first cleared through the Public Affairs Office (PAO). Granting of interviews to the media by psyop soldiers regarding their participation in Desert Shield was prohibited without prior approval from the PAO. Anticipating media coverage of our activation, I submitted a request for assistance in this matter several weeks prior to activation to the PAO. Armed with a pre-approved talk, I looked forward with confidence for the media questions. True to form, W.C.C.O. Radio and several reporters from prominent Twin City newspapers converged on me. I had to discreetly decline

answering several questions. Despite my evasiveness on several issues, the 13th Battalion received a tremendous write-up in the newspapers and an abundance of public support because of the radio interview. My first of many encounters with the media was a success. Prior planning was the key. Anticipation of and having an answer for sensitive questions allowed me to be relatively relaxed under the trying circumstances.

LAST GOODBY

My wife and seven children remained by my side at the airport until departure. My two youngest children, 6 and 8-years old at the time, could not comprehend that they were not going to see their father for a long time. They kept asking me how long 6 months or a year was. My older children could not accept the fact that this was actually happening and I was really leaving. Rose, my wife, had resigned herself to the activation several weeks before when I introduced her at our family support meeting as the head civilian of the organization. Rose was destined to play a key role not only in the battalion, but in all of the family support organizations at Fort Snelling, as well as our home town of Forest Lake, Minnesota. My parents, Bob and Dorothy, were also on hand to see their son off to his second war. Of all those present, I think the situation was harder on my mother than anyone else. She always seemed to be praying for me for some reason or another.

It was nearly as difficult to say a final goodby to my family as it was to the soldiers in my battalion who were not being activated. But the hope remained among all of us that the battalion would soon be reunited in its entirety in Saudi Arabia.

MOBILIZATION

Our arrival at Fayetteville, North Carolina, and Fort Bragg, our mobilization site, on New Year's Eve, was without incident. We were escorted by our advanced party personnel via bus to a mess hall. Despite our late arrival, some fast talking by a few NCOs and a sympathetic mess steward secured for us a gourmet meal of cheeseburgers and fries.

Billeting accommodations near "Green Ramp" were crowded and in exceptionally poor condition as anyone who has ever had reason to be housed in the "lock" area can testify. Reluctantly, the troops accepted the billets, but not without constant complaint. The alternative of tents, in retrospect, may have been more comfortable and sanitary. I anticipated a relatively short stay at the mobilization site because of all the prior planning and preparation my battalion had accomplished. All of the hard work was to pay off now, and the battalion would be the first reserve SOF unit to deploy to Saudi Arabia. For many of the mobilized Civil Affairs units, it would be a month or more before SOF validation was completed.

THE 13th BATTALION EXPANDS

On the evening of our arrival at Fort Bragg, I was informed by USACA/POC that I would have assigned to my command effective immediately, five reserve derivative U.I.C. psyop companies, the 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th and 362nd. Like my battalion, the companies consisted of only the mission functional portions of the unit. In the case of each of these tactical psyop companies, that slice consisted of four loudspeaker teams, vehicular mounted (See Appendix C). Each team consisted of three soldiers instead of the normal six individuals. A command cell consisted of one officer, one senior NCO and a trained loudspeaker maintenance specialist. The 245th Psyop Company contained an additional loudspeaker team. The 245th Company was airborne qualified, on jump status and Capstone to 18th Airborne Corps. Once in Saudi Arabia, all of the reserve tactical loudspeaker teams would be released from the 13th Battalion and placed in Direct Support (DS) to the U.S. divisions Cavalry regiments and Marine Corps. My battalion would have most of these speaker teams reassigned after the ground war ceased for additional support in EPW control. All five of these companies currently remain assigned to the 13th Psyop Battalion due to a realignment within the Reserve Psyop forces which occurred after Desert Storm.

With the assignment of all activated Reserve psyop units under my command, I decided to call a meeting that same evening, for the officers and Senior NCOs. After introductions, I discussed our new command relationship and outlined the training

activities for the immediate future. My expectations for training standards and personnel conduct were made emphatically clear. The five commanders of the psyop companies had explained in detail their new chain of command. No longer would the companies look to their peacetime chain but to my battalion and staff for guidance and direction. I felt strongly that this break with their previous chain of command had to be made in order to avoid unnecessary confusion or problems in control issues.

SOF VALIDATION

New Year's Day 1991, our first full day at Fort Bragg, started with a record SOF Army PT test. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) was our first step in the SOF validation process. The temperature was a brisk 36 degrees with a strong bitter wind. Even to the Minnesota reservists who had just left 10 below zero, with thirty-five below wind chill factors, the North Carolina climate seemed chilly. I was sympathetic to the soldiers from our two Texas psyop companies. They all appeared to suffer from the cold more than anyone else. I wondered if the Texas reservists would be as sympathetic for us when we arrived to face the heat in the Saudi Arabian desert.

General Hurteau observed our testing and ran the 2-mile course with us. Several of us thought we would try and outdistance the General, not realizing the superb physical condition he was in. My 14 min. 30 second two miles were left in

the General's dust. The USACA/POC commander commented favorably on the outstanding physical condition the psyop soldiers were in. Only two soldiers out of the 109 psyop soldiers could not pass the validation P.T. test to SOF standard. Sadly, however, the two individuals consisted of my Battalion S-3, Major Gary Talbot, who sprained his ankle and Battalion Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Tim Jones, who developed a persistent infection in both legs. Neither soldier would recover in time to deploy, and both were subsequently reassigned at Fort Bragg (Appendix D). Replacements had to be found quickly. I appointed Captain Sandy Prescott, one of the LNO officers as the S-3. Second Lieutenant David Cole, back at Fort Snelling, was activated and flown to Fort Bragg as a replacement LNO officer. He was one of the additional soldiers placed on AC in December for contingencies such as this. I had anticipated injuries and planned for this eventuality.

The Battalion CSM position would prove to be much more difficult to fill. My continuing question to the USACA/POC G-1 was how can I procure replacements when I lose a soldier, either prior to deployment or while in Saudi Arabia. I had under my command the entire amount of psyop soldiers activated. There was no other follow-on unit to cross level with. I was never, throughout the war, to receive an answer to my question.

Several days prior to deployment, I had a Special Forces SGM knock on my orderly room door and ask to be interviewed for the vacant Battalion Command Sergeant Major's position. This reservist was on an active duty special work (ADSW) assignment,

SOF validated and had a signed release from his present duty in his hand. My prayers had been answered. SGM McCarter was readily accepted by the soldiers of the battalion, who were as anxious as I for the senior NCO position to be filled (Appendix E).

Members of the battalion and the newly assigned companies continued the SOF validation procedures during the remaining days at Fort Bragg. The 10K forced march with full battle gear was conducted to SOF standard without a loss, along with the land navigation 2 days later. The SOF MOS testing and the psyop leader's exam proved not to be a hurdle either (Appendix F).

The SOF swimming validation was deleted due to time constraints and logistical problems encountered by the evaluation team. It should also be mentioned that all CTT training mandatory for all mobilized soldiers, SOF or not, was conducted, such as weapons qualification, and NBC training.

PROCESSING

In the time between coping with the demands of preparing our soldiers and equipment for war, we had to fight and win the inevitable paperwork battle. Switching from the reserve finance system to the active duty system had to be completed properly and in a timely manner. A multitude of problems would be avoided if our soldiers finance records were converted to the active system and all allotments were in order. The Reserve finance unit that was processing reserve soldiers at Fort Bragg was undermanned and

overwhelmed in their task. Not only was my battalion and its newly assigned companies being processed, but so were several thousand Civil Affairs soldiers. Thankfully, the Psyop units were given priority in all areas of mobilization. To my knowledge, not a single soldier in my command had problems with pay while on active duty.

The 201 personnel files were given a cursory glance and stored in cardboard boxes in a rather haphazard way. We were to recover our files four months later, untouched, without a single entry made. What the Reserve Admin. Co. did while we were in Saudi Arabia remains a mystery.

Most soldiers seem to have an inordinate fear of needles. The rare exceptions had ample opportunity to prove their bravery during the medical processing. Someone made a comment while standing in line, that "if we had all the needles sticking out of us as we had stuck in, we would look like porcupines." The gamma globulin shot proved to be the most debilitating. Possibly because only a short 2 hours after the assault by the Medical Corps, we performed our 10K forced march.

Eye exams and the obtaining of prescription glasses became a major problem, and a potential show stopper. Each soldier requiring prescription lenses was required to have two pair along with one pair of prescription sunglasses. Because the active duty medical facility at Fort Bragg was unable to supply large numbers of required prescription eyewear quickly, an alternate solution had to be found. USACA/POC contracted with local

civilian optometrists to meet the demand. The civilian quality control proved lacking in this matter, and would have been laughable if the situation was not so serious. Soldiers received glasses with the wrong prescriptions, or bifocals inserted upside down. In some cases, lenses were installed on the opposite sides or, as in one case, inverted, with the convex portion towards the eye. The nickname "birth control glasses" was adopted because of the frames homeliness. In many instances, soldiers refused to wear the issue glasses and simply threw them away. Some of our soldiers who had difficult prescriptions to fill were literally handed their new glasses as we were boarding aircraft for departure on "Green Ramp."

EQUIPMENT PREPARATION

Conducted concurrently with all other actions for mobilization was our vehicle and equipment preparation. Five weeks prior to mobilization, selected reserve psyop units began receiving at home station new vehicles called High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). At the mobilization site all of the HMMWVs had the standard alternator replaced with one that had a large ampere capacity. The vehicles were then extensively electrically wired to accommodate the LSS-40 speaker systems that were being mounted on the hatch ring. All vehicles were washed, dried, and painted the desert tan camouflage color scheme and new bumper markings added. Sadly, with very little training time remaining before deployment, a shakedown test could

not be conducted on the unfamiliar equipment. Testing and training with the new speaker systems and vehicles would have to take place in theater.

FINAL DAYS AT FORT BRAGG

On 8 January I was informed by USACA/POC that all activated psyop units would begin deployment to Saudi Arabia, to arrive in theater no later than the 14th of the month. C141 flights for the main body would begin from "Green Ramp" at 0400 hrs. 12 January. I was authorized to send an advance party of five soldiers by commercial air leaving from the Fayetteville airport on 9 January. The advance party arrived at the Dhahran, Saudi Arabian International Airport on 11 January.

Telephonic coordination with 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) was made on 9 January 1991, informing our soon-to-be-higher headquarters of the advance party's arrival time, and the expected arrival date of the main body. Billeting arrangements were made for the battalion at Building 332, Al-Khobar Towers, in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia. Al-Khobar was, in reality, a suburb of the city of Dhahran.

As the advance party departed, the battalion and subordinate units loaded their equipment into every available space in our vehicles and trailers, leaving only enough room for a driver. The vehicles were moved to a secured area near Pope Air Base which adjoins Fort Bragg, and prepared for air movement. All unit members were instructed on tie down procedures, building

cargo pallets and on identification markings. Every air movement procedure, including instructions, was performed by members of the psyop units, to include procurement of all pallets, and securing of tie down straps and buckles. There was no help forthcoming from any outside source or higher headquarters to assist in our departure.

Battalion supply personnel were desperately attempting to procure desert camouflage uniforms and desert night parkas to no avail. The 18th Airborne Corps had depleted the stocks of not only desert gear, but also extra CPOGs. The local surplus stores were of little help in selling desert uniforms either. Supplies from all sources had been depleted We were destined, it seemed, to go to war in the wrong type of uniform. The promise from USACA/POC of fulfilling our desert equipment needs in theater did not offer much solace.

The combination of demanding physical training, maximum stress, minimum sleep and an abundance of inoculations was beginning to take its toll. I was becoming seriously worried for the health of a majority of our soldiers. The question foremost in my mind at this time was what condition would the soldiers be in once we landed in Saudi. All of us were looking forward to departure from Fort Bragg with great anticipation. Perhaps we could at least rest on the flight.

After what seemed like an eternity, at 0300 hours, 12 January, 109 very tired psychological operations soldiers departed with their vehicles and equipment for Green Ramp. Box

lunches and MREs were distributed while the process of tiedown began. All vehicles and pallets had to be chained and strapped properly inside the C141's. We had a vested interest that the tiedown taskings be performed correctly, as all of us would be flying inside the aircraft, inches from our vehicles. We certainly did not want an accident at 10,000 feet.

Upon liftoff, a heavy sigh of relief could be heard in the echo chamber of the aircraft's bay. We were finally on our way to Saudi after 11 long days at the mobilization site. We were the very first SOF reserve unit sent to the Gulf, and were rather proud of the status. All of the Reserve Civil Affairs would follow the psyop to war.

McGuire Air Force Base, next to Fort Dix, New Jersey, was our first refueling stop. I was hit with a wave of nostalgia, because this was where I had started my military career. On June 5, 1968, I was drafted, and reported to Fort Dix the following day for basic and Advanced Infantry Training. I hung up my helmet in 1971 after a tour as an infantry platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, never expecting to return to Fort Dix. Somehow it seemed appropriate to leave for two wars, 22 years apart, from the same place.

After a leisurely lunch and a tearful last call home, we reboarded our aircraft and winged our way across the Atlantic to Ramstein, Germany. Thankfully, our aircraft heating system functioned properly and sleep came mercifully to all of us. Seeming somewhat refreshed and hungry, I was able to procure a

"German" breakfast for the soldiers aborad my aircraft. A "german" breakfast to me translates roughly as "lots of everything."

Much to my elation, a previous member of my reserve battalion was at Ramstein to greet us. After completion of Warrant Officer's school, Mr. Terry Louden re-entered active duty and was now stationed near Darmstadt, Germany. Somehow, his German beer tasted wonderful on top of our breakfast, especially knowing that this would be our last alcohol for a long time to come. CWO Louden's parting comment was, "I hope to see you in Saudi, Colonel." His intelligence unit had been alerted to support VII Corps in the Gulf. We did meet again in Saudi, after the ground war.

With the sun well established in the sky, sleep tended to evade us on our last leg of the flight. With the sling seats no longer appealing, I decided to climb up into the cockpit to watch as we flew over the Mediterranean and into Egyptian airspace. Not being shy, I asked the pilot if I could try flying. From the co-pilot's seat, I proved about as adept at flying a C141 as I did 20 years ago, trying to fly an OH-6 in Vietnam. Once again I reinforced the fact that I was not cut out to be a pilot. The crystal clear sight of the Red Sea and the terrain of the Saudi desert will always remain in my memory as an indescribable experience.

ARRIVAL IN THEATER

Our aircraft landed at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, at 2200 hrs. 13 January. To our immense surprise, we were greeted by a cold rain and wind. Mud was everywhere. Some of our preconceived notions about our new home quickly disappeared. A member of our battalion advance party had arranged an old school bus for our transport to Al-Khobar Towers. Building 332 at Al-Khobar would remain as the battalion's headquarters for our entire time in theater. Our accommodations, although cramped for 109 people, were beyond my expectations. We were prepared to pitch squad and medium tents if needed. A lot of credit was due our advance party for a job well done. With vehicles and equipment secured, everyone enjoyed a few hours of needed sleep.

LINK UP WITH THE 800th MP BRIGADE

After a Meal Ready to Eat (MRE) breakfast the next morning, 14 January, my small staff and I walked the rather convenient city block to the Headquarters of the 800th MP Brigade (Sep) (EPW). My battalion was to be in Direct Support (DS) to the 800th for the duration of the conflict. We would act as a force multiplier for the M.P. brigade assisting in gaining control of the Iraqi EPW and eliciting their cooperation. It was comforting to be greeted by many M.P. friends and acquaintances whom we had trained with only 5 months previously, at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. Brigadier General Joseph F. Conlon III, the brigade commander, was extremely happy to have his EPW psyop unit, as he

always expressed great faith in our capabilities to assist in his mission. Our extensive reserve training relationship would prove to be a tremendous asset throughout the war.

The staff and I received a current intelligence briefing from the 800th Brigade's G-2, along with a concept of operations briefing from the G-3. I was then given the opportunity to brief my plan of support to the M.P. brigade. In concept, for the short term, the battalion would continue team training and preparation of equipment until such time as each of the four EPW camps should be constructed. At that point, I would attach a psyop camp team in D.S. to each of the camp commanders. I then reviewed with General Conlon and his staff what each camp team was capable of performing and how the 13th Battalion staff would direct the accomplishment of our psyop support mission. I did express that it was imperative for the psyop camp teams to have 24 hour access to the EPW. Our training experience had taught us to operate an interrogation/interview facility within the EPW compound, and it was my desire to continue to operate accordingly.

The nightly update briefing conducted by the M.P. brigade was attended by the 13th Battalion Liaison Officer (LNO), Lieutenant Donald Sinwell, or by myself. Constant daily contact with the commander or staff of the 800th was continued throughout Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In retrospect, I feel the cooperation and sense of trust were the primary reasons for the superior results achieved by both units during the campaign. Our

peacetime training affiliation with the 800th MP Brigade would "pay off" in results.

MEETING MY NEW BOSS

Early the next morning, 15 January, the Battalion S-3, the LNO to the 4th Psyop Group and I departed for Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. It was imperative that face-to-face contact be made rapidly with the 4th POG commander, my new boss and rater, Colonel Layton Dunbar. The 6-hour trip allowed the three of us to switch off between driving and napping.

Halfway to Riyadh we stopped to refuel and eat at a convoy support center. As luck would have it, we met two captains from 4th POG, also driving to their headquarters. With our new guides, we arrived at the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) building without incident.

We were greeted by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Jones, the dual-hatted 8th Psyop Battalion C.O. and C.O. of the Joint Psyop Operations Task Force (JPOTF). Having spoken several times by phone with Lieutenant Colonel Jones during our premobilization preparation, I was most anxious to make introductions. We fast became friends and were to mutually cooperate in our taskings throughout the war.

My initial meeting with Colonel Dunbar exceeded my expectations. Colonel Tony Normand, the previous 4th POG C.O. had briefed Colonel Dunbar on the 13th Battalion's unique mission prior to his change of command on 1 Jan 1990. With a strong

recommendation on my behalf from Colonel Normand, I was given the opportunity to brief both Lieutenant Colonel Jones and Colonel Dunbar on the dual mission of my battalion of acting as a force multiplier for the MP's and for pre- and post-testing of psyop products, plus the extraction of psyop intelligence from Iraqi EPW for 4th POG. The three of us then discussed the details of how the 13th Battalion would receive the sensitive psyop products for testing, and how we would transfer the test results, along with the gathered intelligence. At this time also, the attachment of the five tactical reserve companies was discussed. It was decided that all of the reserve companies would be attached to the 6th and 9th Tactical Psyop Battalions for command and control and for support of the combat units in theater.

Near the end of our meeting, my friend, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Devlin, the previous CO of the 6th Psyop Battalion entered the office. He was working the strategic psyop campaign for the Gulf Region out of Cairo, Egypt. He had just arrived from Cairo, for a conference with our mutual commander, Colonel Dunbar. For security reasons, I had not been informed previously of Lieutenant Colonel Devlin's location or mission. It was a pleasurable surprise to see him again.

The evening in Riyadh was spent with Lieutenant Colonel Jones and Lieutenant Colonel Devlin discussing psyop operations and the extreme sensitivity of the issue of psyop use in this theater. Up to this point in Desert Shield, everything produced of a psyop nature had to be reviewed and approved by the Saudi

Arabian government prior to distribution. In most cases, the psyop messages were dramatically modified by the Saudi approving authority prior to dissemination. This procedure was radically changed with the outbreak of hostilities. The United States was no longer required to seek prior approval for production and distribution of psyop products once Desert Storm started.

Early the next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Jones and I attended the ARCENT briefing and were to learn first hand from Lieutenant General Yeosock that we would be at war in less than 24 hours, and were to prepare our units immediately for this certainty. Bidding an abbreviated goodby to Lieutenant Colonel Jones, I collected my S-3 and departed for Al-Khobar to link up with my battalion. The usual 6-hour drive was accomplished in less than 5 hours. Our emergency staff meeting was conducted by 1400 hrs. Ammunition was distributed and guard duties assigned. All NBC gear was given another inspection and made readily available.

Priority was placed on readying camp team #1 in their preparation for attachment to the 401st MP EPW camp, commanded by Colonel Lessley Stovel. The 401st had arrived in country today, 16 January 1991, and would be the first theater MP camp to become operational. The other four MP camps would not arrive until after the start of the air campaign. To date, all Iraqi defectors acquired by any of the coalition forces had to be handed over to the Saudi authorities. With the outbreak of hostilities, nearly all of the Iraqi prisoners of war would be

incarcerated by the U.S. Army's 800th MP Brigade. The exceptions would be those EPW captured by the Saudi Armed Forces who would subsequently retain control. The EPW agreement between the Saudi government and the U.S. Government stated, in essence, that the United States would take initial responsibility for processing all EPW per the Geneva Accords of 1949. Eventually, the host country, Saudi Arabia, would accept full responsibility for all Iraqi prisoners, subject to their military and logistical capability. At that time, Saudi Arabia did not have the number of trained soldiers necessary to guard, or the logistical ability to sustain the number of prisoners projected.

WAR

A resounding cheer was heard throughout Kohbar Village on 17 January 1991 as the news broke of a massive coalition airstrike on Baghdad, Iraq Now there was no turning back from our purpose of defeating the Iraqi Army and freeing Kuwait.

Promptly at 0400 Saudi time, 18 January, Al-Khobar was subjected to its first of many "SCUD" missile attacks. Initially, this Iraqi terror weapon achieved its purpose, especially when a Patriot missile would intercept. The resounding explosion and shock wave scared everyone for, at first, we were unaware of the anti-missile capability of the Patriot missiles, and thought that the aerial explosions may well be showering chemical weapons or biological agents on us. The "SCUD" attacks continued off and on, both day and night, with

many false alarms. We soon lost track of how many attacks we were subjected to, and by 23 January, some of us watched Patriots intercept SCUD missiles from our rooftop. Not until 27 January did we have a respite at Khobar Village. We found out why that day. Saddam switched his missiles to hit Riyadh for the first time. Maybe we could start to get some rest at night now.

During a SCUD attack on 20 January, I was talking to my wife and family by phone for the first time since my arrival. I had to reassure my family that the Iraqi missile attacks were completely harmless and were more of a nuisance than anything else. However, I don't know who was more scared at the time, my wife or I. In this war, it seemed that all of America would share in the horrors of war together, whether in Saudi, or back in the United States. As typified by this example of a high technology satellite linked phone call to my home, modern instantaneous communications would, for better or for worse, unite our entire country in seeking a common goal: defeat of Saddam and his army. As the war continued, the letters from home informed the deployed soldiers that the citizens of the United States were being kept well informed of the war's progress. In most cases, the public was better informed than those of us who were participating.

THE CAMP TEAMS DEPLOY

The 20th of January was also a memorable day for the battalion. We deployed camp team #1 in support of the 401st MP

camp. The timing was perfect, because the prison camp officially became operational at 0950 hrs. The processing area, holding area, and one compound along with our camp team were ready for business. At 1050 hours, we received our first enemy prisoners of war (EPW) at the theater EPW camp. These first prisoners of what was to become later, a virtual flood of humanity, proved to be exceptionally cooperative with the interrogators. We were to discover, much to our delight, that the Iraqi soldiers did not have a Code of Conduct such as our military did. The Iraqi EPW, with rare exception, would tell us anything we asked. In fact, the Iraqi would volunteer information we never thought to ask for. In one such case of volunteered information, we were able to reverse a negative effect that our psyop was having. Some of our leaflets were bordered with red color in order to contrast with the desert background and be more visible to the enemy. An EPW volunteered information that the Iraqi enlisted soldiers, our primary target audience, would not touch our leaflets because they were instructed not to handle anything red in color, as it meant danger. With this information passed on to 4th POG, a simple change in border color was made. Our psyop then became an effective tool in influencing the enemy's will to resist. Now the Iraqi would pick up and read the psyop products.

In the following weeks, the 800th MP Brigade constructed three more EPW camps. The plan for construction was to locate two camps and a medical field hospital in close proximity to support both the Eastern and Western theaters of operation. The

two Eastern EPW camps were called "Bronx" and located south of the Saudi Arabian town of An Nu'Arriyah, near Sarrar. The two Western EPW camps were called "Brooklyn" and located just south of the city of Hafer Al Batin and north of King Khalid Military City (KKMC). Both of these camp sites were barren desert, but were located geographically near the corps rear areas, and far enough back from the combat zone to comply with the Geneva Accords of 1949. The two "Bronx" and the "Brooklyn" camps were near the Main Supply Route (MSR) for Army Central Command (ARCENT) and Marine Central Command (MARCENT) and in proximity of the two small Saudi Arabian EPW camps.

The 13th Battalion had now placed four of its five psyop camp teams in direct support of these camps. The Officer in Charge (OIC) of each camp team were the following:

Psyop Camp Team One (OIC Captain Richard Cady) as previously mentioned, D.S. to the 401st MP EPW Camp (Bronx).

Psyop Camp Team Two (OIC First Lieutenant William Leitschuh) D.S. to the 403rd MP EPW Camp (Bronx).

Psyop Camp Team Three (OIC Captain Gerald Hartwig) D.S. to the 301st MP EPW Camp (Brooklyn).

Psyop Camp Team Four (OIC Captain Daniel Kling) D.S. to the 402nd MP EPW Camp (Brooklyn).

Psyop Camp Team Five (OIC Captain John Young) was initially retained as the Battalion Reaction Team, and provided the crew for the AN/MSQ-85B Mobile Audio/Visual Van (Appendix C).

PSYOP SUPPORT TO THE MP CAMPS

Each Psyop Camp Team OIC briefed the supported M.P. EPW Camp Commander and staff on the mission, organization and capabilities of the team. Basic Arabic language lessons were conducted and cards with simple Arabic commands and camp rules printed in Arabic were distributed to the M.P. guards. The team's operations tent and housing locations were identified and confirmed, along with procedures for the psyop interrogators to access the EPW.

As the EPW camps received Iraqi prisoners, the camp teams immediately assisted the M.P.'s in pacifying the prisoners and conditioning them to accept the M.P. camp rules. Cards with the rules and regulations and daily activities were distributed (Appendix H).

General Conlon determined that it was taking the MP processing companies far too long to accomplish their missions. At the present rate, one EPW was processed every 45 minutes, a totally unacceptable situation. The 13th Battalion conducted an in-depth study of the processing procedures. Inprocessing initially consisted of:

a. Strip search

b. Personnel Property Record

c. Wrist banding with the EPW's personal information typed out on a sealed label.

d. Fingerprinting

e. I.D. photo

f. Finance records established

g. Enrollment in the EPW computer data base

h. An interview with a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),

i. Delousing powder station

j. Shower

k. Medical Exam

l. Issue of clothing, blanket and prayer rug.

First, a human time-motion efficiency study was conducted on the wrist-banding procedures. This procedure was taking the longest time to accomplish and held the greatest promise for efficiency improvement. An 11-minute average for wrist-banding was reduced to a 2-minute procedure by the following methods: eliminating unnecessary information from the EPW identification label, preprinting of common information on the label and readjusting the work area for human motion efficiency.

All other areas of EPW processing were evaluated in an identical manner. Changes were made, and tested with several Saudi Arabian Special Forces officers that were assigned to the battalion as interpreters. They acted the part of Iraqi EPW, and spoke in Arabic only, during the processing, to identify methods we could use without the aid of interpreters.

Both the initial processing procedure and the highly modified processing test were videotaped by our AN/MSQ-85B team headed by Sergeant First Class Gerhard Christ. General Conlon and his staff assessed both videotapes and initiated the

abbreviated procedures in all of the theater EPW camps. The shortcuts instituted included:

a. EPW were allowed to keep private property.

b. Showers were eliminated during inprocessing.

c. Only the thumbprint was fingerprinted.

d. Essential data only was included in the computer data base.

e. Essential data only was printed on the ID wrist bracelet.

f. Finance activity was postponed.

g. In and out processing were conducted simultaneously.

The assistance given to the MP processing companies improved the efficiency of the EPW inprocessing from an average time of 45 minutes per prisoner, to less than 8 minutes.

Tape recordings in Arabic were developed that explained the processing procedures. These tapes were played over loud speakers, to the Iraqi awaiting processing in the holding areas. This innovation elicited the EPW's cooperation, alleviated their initial anxieties, and increased processing efficiency even further.

Additionally, the psyop camp teams identified English-speaking Iraqi, and utilized them to assist in the processing. As the war progressed, Kuwaiti students who volunteered as interpreters were also employed by the M.P. processing companies.

Problems encountered in the day-to-day activities of the EPW were identified and addressed with the M.P. camp authorities.

SANITATION

Latrines constructed by civilian contractors in Saudi Arabia were built to U.S. Army specifications. that is, four holes with no privacy. To the M.P.'s dismay, the Iraqi would not use the facilities because they did not sit, they squatted. They also had a great need for privacy. A modification was made, converting the latrines into a three-hole facility with dividers for privacy. Now the Iraqi would use the latrines and eliminate the unsanitary method of using the area behind their tents. In the Arab culture, a water bottle and the left hand are used to clean the body after using the latrine. The problem encountered by the M.P.'s was twofold because of this Arab procedure of cleanliness. Huge quantities of additional water had to be transported to the camps in order to accommodate the prisoners. Additionally, the quantities of human waste products increased and the amount to be sterilized by burning multiplied.

The answer to the water problem and waste disposal centered around retraining the Iraqi to use toilet paper. The one failure of all the missions tasked to my battalion during Desert Storm was in convincing the prisoners in using the Western method of toilet paper.

RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

Initial interviews with prisoners indicated that the American captors would encounter severe problems in EPW cooperation unless we accommodated and respected the Moslem

prisoners' religious beliefs and needs. All camp teams established permanent markers to indicate the direction of East in all 40 of the 2,000 man compounds within the four E.P. W. camps. Now the Moslems would know in which direction the Holy Mosque in Mecca was located, and face towards the East. This praying towards Mecca occurred five times per day and lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes per session. The MP's had to adjust the prisoner feeding times and other activities accordingly. Large quantities of prayer rugs, towels and other cloth were issued for prayer purposes, thus establishing a sense of trust and credibility between captor and captive.

Over our loudspeaker systems, the teams played music and rebroadcasted recordings from the "Voice of the Gulf," the U.S. psyop radio station. But during prayer time, we would stop and play a recorded Moslem "Call to Prayer." In this manner, we were able to deliver our psyop messages to the Iraqi EPW with maximum effectiveness.

FOOD PROBLEMS AND THE MEALS READY TO EAT (MRE)

In the Arab culture, pork is considered an unclean food and not eaten or touched, even in times of emergency. Our psyop teams instructed the M.P. guards to separate any of the M.R.E.'s containing pork products from the prisoners mess issue lines. However, we soon found that we had minority groups of Iraqi Christians that were more than willing to eat the pork rations.

When the ground war came to a close however, the EPW camps

were inundated with Iraqi and we had to dispense with separating the pork MRE's for expedience sake, but only for a short time.

Germany donated large quantities of military rations from the former East German Republic for use by the prisoners. However, most of the German rations contained pork products. Due to the desperate physical condition many of the Iraqis were in when first captured, we made a command decision not to reveal to them this information on pork rations. The thousands of malnourished prisoners quickly regained their health and vigor from such high fat, high-caloried meals, probably saving countless lives. This situation continued for several weeks until the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) discovered what was taking place. Most of the ICRC members in Saudi Arabia came from Switzerland and spoke fluent German. The ICRC revealed to the Iraqi EPW that we were feeding them German pork rations. We expected fallout from the prisoners and were surprised when we had feedback from them, indicating that they were so hungry they would eat the rations regardless of the pork content. Luckily, however, enough other non-pork rations were reaching the camps that we soon were able to eliminate the German rations from the Iraqi diet. The benefits from this incident were healthy prisoners, and later, happy American soldiers who gladly traded their M.R.E.s for the German rations.

PSYOP USED ON EPW

One of the psyop operations conducted on the EPW consisted of loud speaker transmissions of prerecorded messages in Arabic. The messages were focused on eliciting the cooperation of the Iraqi to accept the authority of the MPs and abide by the camp rules and regulations. An understanding and appreciation of the U.S. and coalition forces policies and actions was instilled in the EPW simultaneously with the broadcast messages.

Music was played for the EPW during appropriate times of the day in hopes that a calming effect would prevail. Understandably, we had a lot of requests from the MP guards to play the latest hits. However, as tempting as it was to play modern music for the homesick M.P. soldiers, the mood of the prisoners had to take precedence.

The AN/MSQ-85B Audio Visual vehicle has the capability to show videotape movies on a large two-sided screen.Initially, purchased and approved Saudi Arabian videos were shown, but were not well received by the Iraqis. We came to realize that our enemy was more attuned to the outside world than we thought. As we were to discover, the prisoners favorite movies were "Superman" and "Top Gun."

In the evenings, the double-sided screen was set up just outside the compound's barbed wire. With the projector focusing on this dual-capable screen, the movie could be viewed on both sides. The EPW watched the film from inside the compound, while the M.P.'s watched from outside. There were enough English

speaking Iraqi to interpret for their peers. The viewing of movies was a total success as a tool in the control of prisoners. We could threaten to take away this privilege if the M.P.s did not receive cooperation or if rules were broken. A request was sent to 4th POG for a second AN/MSQ-85B with its support team of trained operators. There was only one other in theater, so I did not have my hopes up of receiving it. However, 2 days after submission of my request, the battalion received the crew and vehicle. Now we had the capability to show movies at both the two East camps and two West camps, rotating between, every other night.

PRISONER SPORTS PROGRAMS

Activities were found for the EPW in order to keep their minds occupied. Sports activities allowed us to make observations on any developing infrastructures or to identify malcontents, rabble rousers, agitators or secret police. Using this technique, we were able to move the potential trouble makers to special compounds, thus isolating them from the main body of prisoners. Innumerable potential problems, riots or breakout attempts were averted in this manner. The camp teams continually remained proactive when it came to EPW control methods.

PRISONER EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Classes on speaking and writing English were conducted for the prisoners during their free time. Many prisoners took

advantage of the opportunity to learn or improve their English. The classes also allowed us to identify prisoners to act as interpreters for inprocessing of newly captured Iraqi, thus easing the burden on the M.P.'s. Cooperative English-speaking Iraqi that we had learned to trust, were used to set up a network within each prison compound. These cooperative prisoners would inform on trouble makers, provide us leads on who to interrogate and identify officers posing as enlisted. Every activity the camp teams were involved in with the EPW had an ulterior motive.

Art classes and especially our Art Contest for the EPW were extremely popular, and provided a wealth of psyop relevant information. Not only were we able to gain a greater understanding of our target audience but were shown in illustrated forum how to influence their minds graphically. Posters were developed for EPW control purposes by the prisoners themselves, and posted around the compounds.

SAUDI S.F.

A critical need throughout the theater of operations was for Arabic interpreters. Saudi Arabia supplied to the non-Arab coalition forces, and especially to the United States, the majority of Arab/English linguists. On 29 January four Saudi Special Forces captains were attached to the 13th Battalion as interpreters. We were to eventually have eight Saudi and seven Kuwaiti interpreters attached (Appendix I). A strong bond developed between the Saudi interpreters and the camp teams.

Sergeant First Class Christ and Captain Abdallah became inseparable. Sergeant First Class Christ was a German and had served in his youth in the German Army, and later became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Captain Abdallah had attended German language school in Heidelberg and graduated from a German college. These two linguists would interrogate Iraqi prisoners, then converse openly in German in case the Iraqi understood English.

Each camp team now had a Saudi interpreter attached. Our interrogators were no longer limited to speaking with prisoners that could understand English or by having to use a prisoner as an interpreter.

After the battle of Kafji, elements of the Iraqi 5th Republican Ground Division were captured by U.S. Marines and coalition forces. This influx of EPW were the first involuntary prisoners we were to encounter. Until now, we had only voluntary defectors from Saddam's legions. When the 5th Division EPW's reached the two Bronx camps on February 1st, I was determined to observe first hand how they would react to both the inprocessing and with being interrogated. The reaction from the Iraqi officers was similar to the defectors we had interrogated so far. They had no inhibitions about discussing any information we asked for. Several of the officers spoke fluent English, making our job much less complicated. I gathered the 16 Iraqi officers, had an MRE issued to them, and proceeded to show them how to warm and eat it. While we ate, the interrogators asked several pertinent

questions. The first questions posed were to an Iraqi armored company commander who had 10 years of service, and had fought 8 years in the Iran/Iraq war a hardened combat veteran. The questions concerned chemical weapons use by Iraq. We asked him if he had fought in a chemical environment and if so, for how long a duration. His answer was: "Yes, that he had, and for 43 consecutive days." The Iraqi Army used decontamination bunkers for rest and eating, on a rotational basis. He also was proud of the fact that his unit fought and beat the U.S. Marines in Kafji. However, he realized the war was over for him. This pertinent information of an intelligence nature also had psyop significance, and was quickly passed up through proper channels. At this stage of the war, the two main concerns of the U.S. and coalition forces were: would the Iraqi fight; and, if so, would chemical weapons be used? With the information we received on 1 February 1991, it seemed that both concerns were justified. We had a lot of work to do if we expected to break the fighting spirit of the Iraqi army using psyop.

By continuing with questions to the Iraqi EPW, using two of the Saudi S.F. as interpreters, we also learned that our new prisoners felt they had been badly mistreated by their initial captors. Several prisoners spoke of being hit with rifles and clubs despite the fact that they cooperated fully. I was unable to ascertain if the abuse came from Arab coalition forces or the U.S. Marines. With camp team number 5 not yet deployed, I requested permission from General Conlon and Colonel Dunbar to

insert camp team 5 into the Marine's Central Command (MARCENT) Corps EPW cage. The Marines, although initially suspicious, relented and allowed Captain Young and his team to operate within the compound.

PRE- AND POST-TESTING OF PSYOP

With all five psyop camp teams committed, the battalion soon became fully functional in pre- and post-testing of psyop products and in gathering psyop relevant information.

Each separate camp team would pre-test simultaneously on the EPW newly developed psyop leaflets to ascertain the potential effectiveness on the Iraqi soldiers. The results of the pre-testing were sent to the 13th Battalion Headquarters where the information would be consolidated and cross-checked for accuracy and determine if any patterns were revealed. The test results showing potential effectiveness and suggested changes were forwarded to 4th POG. the 4th POG would make necessary adjustments, print the leaflets in quantity, then distribute the leaflets on the Iraqi forces. As new prisoners were interrogated, they would be asked if they had read the leaflets and if so, what effect the psyop leaflets had on them and their colleagues. By pre- and post-testing in this manner, the effectiveness of the psyop campaign was increased dramatically in theater (Appendix J). One particular leaflet was adjusted for increased effectiveness by adding a beard to the guard, and bananas to the fruit tray. The beard was interpreted by the

Iraqi to mean that their Moslem religion would be respected, and the bananas in the picture indicated that they would be fed their favorite food as a prisoner of war. An untold number of Iraqi upon surrendering, asked for the bananas they were promised in the leaflet. By simple changes such as those indicated, the will of the Iraqi to resist was slowly broken.

PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

Information of psyop relevance gathered from the prisoners was forwarded to 4th POG for use in the overall psyop campaign. Prisoners indicated to us that more Iraqi forces would defect if we printed instructions on the leaflets that indicated the proper procedure to use in surrendering. Suggestions such as this were capitalized on and found to be highly effective. The Iraqi prisoners were an invaluable help in increasing our theater psyop campaign. No one understood our target audience better than the actual EPW themselves.

SURRENDER TAPES

As the bombing and psyop campaign continued into February, an ever-increasing number of Iraqi soldiers defected. Many of these defectors were willing to make tape-recorded surrender appeals for us to broadcast on their units. Our AN/MSQ-85B vehicles were invaluable for production of the surrender appeal tapes. These tapes did not contain the defectors name in order to safeguard his family in Iraq from retaliation (Appendix K).

We had discovered through questioning that many Iraqi soldiers, against regulations, had portable transistor radios, and listened to the "Voice of the Gulf" psyop radio station. The surrender appeal tapes were broadcast by three means: Radio ("Voice of the Gulf"), speaker-equipped helicopters, and tactical loudspeaker teams. The effects of the surrender appeal tape recordings were overwhelming. Groups of soldiers started to surrender rather than individuals. The 48th Iraqi Infantry Division was targeted with concentrated leaflet drops and broadcasted surrender appeals. This culminated in the mass surrender of an entire battalion, to include the commander. A three-man tactical psyop loudspeaker team was airlifted into the Iraqi battalion position and used to organize the prisoner extraction by CH-47.

The broadcasted surrender appeal used on the Iraqi battalion which surrendered enmasse was produced by a prisoner from the 48th Division. The leaflets used were pre-tested on prisoners from the 48th Iraqi Division. Thus, the 13th Psyop Battalion became a key contributor to the theater psyop campaign by using all of the previously mentioned methods.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications between battalion headquarters and the camp teams would continue to be a severe problem throughout Desert Storm and the remainder of our time spent in Saudi Arabia after the ceasefire. Our battalion was authorized P.R.C. 77 FM radios, but with their limited range of 20 km, they proved to be totally

worthless. Our operating ranges were several hundred kilometers between battalion headquarters and the camps. The 800th MP Brigade did not have radios authorized in their TO&E, so we received no help from that quarter either. However, at times, a nonsecure land line sporadically worked between the Bronx camps and the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters. But, we could not rely on the intermittent landline connection, or have the needed secure link.

Our other attempts at completing a secure communications link also proved futile. 4th P.O.G. dedicated three long-range secure radios from the groups commo "float." The 4th Group commo officer dedicated many long manhours attempting to make this system work, but to no avail. For some unknown reason, every electronic communication system we tried, failed.

Out of desperation, we enlisted a civilian, Paul Ramie, to assist us in our commo problem. Paul was a military retiree employed by a U.S. civilian agency to head up a telephone satellite system in Saudi on which our G.I.'s could call home. Paul discovered that the soil composition around the EPW camps contained a high degree of iron. The natural iron deposits interfered with radio signals thus negating all of our attempts at commo linkage with our camp teams.

Messenger service provided by the 800th MP Brigade every 3 or 4 days helped to some extent. But this messenger service was intermittent, and not totally secure.

The battalion's primary method of communication throughout the conflict remained face-to-face contact. Usually this was accomplished by myself and my sergeant major. We spent many long and sleepless hours during the war, on Tap Line Road (Appendix L). A secure communications system in conjunction with a secure FAX machine would have proven invaluable in our operation. Pre- and post-testing of psyop leaflets and tape recordings, along with intelligence information would have been expedited, allowing a faster response in adjusting the theater psyop campaign. Communication problems seemed to be rampant throughout the theater for most of the coalition forces.

ATTEMPTS TO ACTIVATE THE REMAINDER OF THE BATTALION FAIL

During the course of the war continuous requests were made through General Conlon and Colonel Dunbar for the remainder of the 13th Battalion to be activated and deployed to theater. Our camp teams and battalion staff were working 18 to 20 hr days. We were understaffed and overwhelmed with work and needed augmentation.

Our request was always approved by our higher headquarters but rejected by ARCENT. Priority was going to combat units in the air flow (Appendix M).

Part of our manpower shortage was relieved when the 800th MP Brigade attached the 338th MP detachment to my battalion (Appendix N). 4th POG attached several psyop interrogators and a battalion supply NCO. These measures increased our capabilities

and offered some relief to the camp teams, prior to the ground war.

TRANSFER OF EPW TO SAUDI CONTROL

Prior to the start of the ground war, the prisoner population in the theater EPW camps fluctuated. Transfers of Iraqi prisoners to the Saudi Arabian EPW camps took place, contingent upon the capability of the host nation to accommodate them. The Saudis very slowly increased their capability to incarcerate EPW, and by May 1st were to take control of all Iraqi prisoners of war, along with the four American built camps.

To expedite the transfer of prisoners to the Saudi military, the psyop camp teams conditioned the Iraqi mentally. Loudspeaker messages were broadcast, explaining the agreement signed by the governments of the Untied States and Saudi Arabia, concerning prisoners of war. Printed messages explaining the transfer were distributed. Key Iraqi communicators were given special instructions on the transfer to the Saudi camps, and used to assist the MP's. Selected credible Iraqi EPW were allowed to accompany the first transfers of prisoners, then returned to spread reassurance among the remaining EPW. By adopting active measures such as those mentioned, serious incidents during the transfers were eliminated. Additionally, during the initial transfers, several of the Saudi S.F. officers attached to the 13th Battalion accompanied the prisoners to insure that no

language problems would preclude a smooth transition from taking place.

GROUND WAR

As the coalition forces transitioned from the air campaign to the ground war portion of Desert Storm, both the 800th MP Brigade and the 13th Psyop Battalion were soon overwhelmed with Iraqi prisoners. Camp Team 5 supporting the MARCENT Corp Cage would be the first recipients of this flood of humanity. Starving, dehydrated and wounded Iraqi soldiers flooded the MARCENT Camp Cage starting February 26th, taxing to the limit the Marine's ability to feed and house them.

Remnants of a typhoon that had devastated Bangladesh also destroyed the Marine prison camp's infirmary, mess hall, and prisoner housing facilities. A riot of frightened confused and demoralized EPW took place, threatening to get out of control. The Marine Guards fired shots over the prisoners heads as the barbed wire was rushed. Just as the wire and supporting stakes were being leveled by the stampeding prisoners, two of the camp team soldiers, accompanied by a Kuwaiti interpreter entered the prison compound unarmed. Their only defense was the backpack LSS-40 loudspeaker system, and their minds. Within minutes, the psyop team calmed the prisoners and, unassisted, were able to get the estimated two thousand rioters to disperse. The psyop team explained to the Iraqi what the Marine plan was for distribution of food and blankets and also, how to acquire medical assistance

if needed. The bravery exhibited, above and beyond the call of duty culminated in the Bronze Star medal being awarded to these exceptional soldiers. Without doubt, a serious and potentially deadly incident was avoided by Camp Team 5. The Marines' praise for the value of psyop was a complete reversal from that exhibited when the camp team first arrived.

On March 5th, the MARCENT corp cage officially closed and camp team 5's mission with the Marines terminated. The Bronx camps were receiving more than their share of prisoners when compared to the Brooklyn camps, so Camp Team 5 was transferred to reinforce camp teams 1 and 2. However, regardless of the transfer of Camp Team 5, the attachment of the 338th MI Detachment, additional 4th POG personnel along with Saudi and Kuwaiti interpreters, the 13th Battalion was stretched to the limit.

TO KUWAIT CITY

I had learned that shortly after the ground war ended the Reserve Psyop companies were going to be released from the combat units they had been supporting. With this information in hand I set out on March 1st to find my psyop boss, now operating out of Kuwait City, and request that I have attached 15 loudspeaker teams with vehicles. I explained how we desperately needed assistance in both prisoner evacuation control from the VII and XVIII Airborne Corps Cages, and in the theater cages for our camp teams. In this request, we were successful. I thus had

reattached most of the reservists I had previously assigned to the battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during mobilization (Appendix O).

AIR FORCE A-10 SUPPORT

With the influx of overwhelming numbers of EPW, the psyop camp teams were unable to quickly separate and segregate potential agitators during inprocessing. Republican Guard and Secret Police were inadvertently placed in the main EPW compounds. Near riot conditions started to surface in all the EPW camps in theater as the staunch supporters of Saddam attempted to foment trouble. Stop-gap measures had to be found to alleviate the situation in the camps until the agitators could be identified and isolated.

The 4th Psyop Groups Production and Development Battalion (PDB) was located near King Fahd airport. Also based out of King Fahd were hundreds of Air Force A-10 tank killer aircraft. I would always stop and marvel at how businesslike this no-nonsense aircraft looked, whenever I visited the P.D.B. Now I thought of this nemesis of Iraqi armor as a possible solution to our control problem in the EPW camps. Through discreet inquiry we procured an unofficial test flight of several A-10 "Warthogs." The aircraft flew "inadvertently" over an EPW camp. The desired change in behavior of the EPW was immediate. From then on, periodic flights of U.S. aircraft over all of the EPW camps took

place. Thus, the test flights served a dual purpose, and the Air Force produced another psyop tool for our use.

In preparation for the transfer of the theater prison camps to Saudi Arabian control, the 800th MP Brigade conducted training classes for the Saudi National Guard. Concurrently, the 13th Psyop Battalion trained approximately 20 Saudi S.F. officers in prisoner of war psyop operations. The classes on EPW psyop operations were well received by the Saudis and readily adopted for prisoner control. We were able to observe with pride how our Saudi psyop students were able to use psyop on the Iraqi prisoners, rather than brute force for control methods.

INTO IRAQ

After the ground war ceased, but prior to the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the theater camps continued to be inundated with prisoners on a daily basis. The deep concern of the 800th MP Brigade was that the prisoners were being transported to the camps without prior warning from the VII Corps. The 800th MP Brigade could not plan properly for feeding, housing and processing without some prior warning of the numbers of prisoners projected. General Conlon tasked the 13th Psyop Battalion to determine if the prisoners were actually soldiers rather than civilians posing as soldiers, in hopes of gaining better treatment than that accorded refugees (Appendix P). We were also tasked to find out why the 800th was not receiving prior notification of the number of prisoners to expect at the theater

camps. With two Saudi interpreters and my sergeant major I flew to VII Corps to do a demographic study at the EPW Cages. Next we flew to the combat unit holding areas and interviewed prisoners at each location. My findings were that the prisoners being taken in the VII Corps A.O. were in fact Iraqi soldiers, but from two opposing sides. Most of the Iraqi soldiers were Shiite Moslems who had revolted against Saddam's regime in Basra. The minority were loyal supporters of Saddam who were in pursuit of the rebels and had inadvertently wandered across the ceasefire line. The U.S. combat units were circumventing the VII Corps prison cage and sending the Iraqi prisoners directly to the theater cages, on back haul resupply helicopters. Therefore, VII Corps was cut out of the prisoner flow and could not supply information on expected EPW that were in the network. With this information, I was able to make a full report to GEN Conlon on the situation in VII Corps area. GEN Conlon was able to rectify the problem by advising the VII Corps commander of this situation. The prisoners were simply transported to the VII Corps cage, and with the reporting system working again, the problem was solved.

LOSING PSYOP ATTACHMENTS

With the signing of the ceasefire by Iraq and the coalition forces, rapid progress was made in the transfer of prisoners of war to the host nation, Saudi Arabia. This downsizing of the prison population affected the 13th Battalion. The reserve

tactical psyop companies were released from attachment to the 13th Battalion and were among some of the first U.S. forces to be deployed out of theater. Attached active duty psyop soldiers and their AN/MSQ-85B Audio Visual vehicles were released shortly after this, and departed theater with the lead elements of XVIII Airborne Corps. The 800th MP Brigade released the 338th MI Detachment from attachment to the battalion, allowing their departure back to the United States.

PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS STUDY

During the downsizing of my battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group requested a study on the effectiveness of the psyop campaign for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. I presented the results of this study to Colonel Dunbar, his staff and the other psyop battalion commanders in Riyadh on 15 March. The results of our testing conducted on EPW showed without a doubt that psyop was an extremely effective tool in destroying the enemies will to resist. Psyop had contributed significantly in the one-sided victory over the Iraqi army.

In general, 98 percent of the Iraqi EPW interviewed stated they believed the messages on our psyop leaflets and were influenced by them. Nearly all EPW surrendered with leaflets in possession, despite death threats from their officers.

Fifty-eight percent of all EPW had listened to psyop radio broadcasts and stated that they were influenced in their decision to defect or surrender by the messages.

Because of range limitations of the loudspeaker broadcasts, only 34 percent of the Iraqi interviewed claimed they had heard surrender appeals (Appendix Q).

4th POG requested that we submit our battalion after-action report in the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Long Report format. The battalion complied with the request and used the opportunity to identify areas and concerns that need to be addressed in order to conduct successful psyop EPW operations in the future (Appendix R).

On April 14th the 4th POG commander and staff along with all its operationally assigned units departed Saudi Arabia for Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 6th Psyop Battalion, however, was deployed to northern Iraq in support of "Operation Provide Comfort." This left the 13th Battalion as the only psyop command in theater. I technically did not have a higher headquarters. I was now in command of all psyop forces in theater.

TURNOVER OF EPW TO SAUDI FORCES

During the next several weeks, the 13th Psyop Battalion participated with the 800th MP Brigade in turning over the administration of the last U.S. EPW camps in theater to Saudi Arabian forces. On April 29th, the 800th MP Brigade and the 13th Psyop Battalion had effectively terminated the EPW mission with the transfer of the last remaining EPW to the Saudi National Guard. The 13th Psyop Battalion, with its mission completed,

would depart Saudi Arabia April 30 for Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and demobilization processing.

DEPARTURE FROM THEATER

Prior to 30 April, while completing our EPW mission, the battalion also prepared for departure. A 40 foot military van was inspected by customs officials and our equipment loaded. All vehicles were cleaned and hand-receipted to the transportation command at the port storage area near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

The 13th Battalion departed Dahran International Airport by a chartered 747, a more comfortable aircraft than the C141 that brought us to Saudi Arabia. We arrived at Fort Bragg and outprocessed in good order. Gone was the air of excitement and tension that prevailed at Fort Bragg when we last saw our mobilization site.

RETURN TO HOME STATION

We departed Fort Bragg on 3 May and landed at the Minneapolis Airport, to be greeted by a cheering crowd of friends, reporters, dignitaries, and of course, our loved ones. We were all overwhelmed by the excitement and enthusiasm of the greeters. A reception was prearranged at the Fort Snelling mess hall. The Commander of the Army Reserve, Major General Sandler, presented the welcome home address and related to the crowd that he had once been the commander of the 13th Psyop Battalion. Senator Dave Durrenberger and Representative Jerry Sikorski also

spoke and presented the battalion with an American flag that had flown over the National Capital during Desert Storm.

The reception was attended by over two thousand people. It was televised on several Twin Cities stations and had a large write-up in the local newspapers. WCCO radio did a live broadcast. During out processing at Fort Bragg we were warned to expect a warm welcome home, but what we received was beyond our wildest imagination. This was truly a turnaround from the type of welcome I received when returning from Vietnam in November of 1970.

BACK TO NORMAL

By the evening of 3 May, I was in our local church for my second youngest daughter's first Holy Communion practice. Bridget received her First Communion at 9:00 AM the next morning with a reception attended by parents and family. Shortly after my daughter's First Communion party, I packed my sleeping bag and departed for a weekend of Boy Scout Campout with my two sons. With a good night's sleep that Sunday evening, May 5th, I awoke on Monday morning and returned to my school teaching job. I was greeted warmly by my high school students whom I had left that late fall. As an officer in the U.S. Army Reserve, I understood the duty and responsibility I had of going to war quickly, if my country called. However, I also personally felt that I had the responsibility to go back to a normal peaceful existence just as quickly. War had interrupted my life and the life of my family

twice in 20 years. But this is part of the price all Americans have to pay for the freedoms we enjoy.

CONCLUSION

During Operation Desert Storm, the first Psychological Operations Campaign ever performed on EPW by the United States was conducted by the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion.

The 13th Battalion's three primary missions were to, first, act as a force multiplier for the 800th MP Brigade in EPW control operations. Second, pre- and post-test psychological operations material on EPW as directed by 4th Psychological Operations Group. Third, collect information from the EPW for psyop product development and improvement.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 13th Psyop Battalion supported four theater EPW camps dispersed throughout the VII and XVIII Airborne Corp areas and one Corp level EPW camp operated by MARCENT. A total of over 70,000 Iraqi EPW were processed, interned and eventually transferred to Saudi Arabian control during the war.

From 13 January 1991 through 28 April 1991, the 13th Psyop Battalion assisted the 800th MP Brigade by quelling numerous riots and defused an untold number of potential disturbances.

The 4th Psyop Group was assisted in the conduct of the theater psyop campaign through the pre- and post-testing of 28 distinct psyop leaflets and ten tape recorded surrender appeals. Twelve separate surrender appeals and two leaflets were developed

and produced by the 13th Psyop Battalion. Psyop relevant intelligence extracted during EPW interrogations assisted greatly in the overall effectiveness of the theater psyop campaign.

The 13th Psyop Battalion proved to be a valuable asset and a force multiplier to both the 800th MP Brigade and 4th Psyop Group during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Upon demobilization, the citizen soldiers of the 13th Psyop Battalion returned to civilian life with a deep sense of satisfaction for a job well done.

Appendix A

Orders to Active Duty

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, Fourth United States Army
Fort Sheridan, Illinois 60037-5000

PERMANENT ORDERS 144-2 23 December 1990

The U.S. Army Reserve Unit shown and its members are ordered to active duty under (10 USC 673b) for period shown unless sooner released by proper authority.

Period: One hundred eighty (180) days effective 9706302 DEC 90

Additional Instructions: Unit is ordered to active federal duty effective 27 Dec 90 at its assigned levels of personnel and equipment. Unit will mobilize and move to assigned Mobilization Stations (MS) IAW FORSCOM Mobilization Stationing Planning System (MSPS), unless otherwise directed by COR FORSCOM. Unit ordered to active duty must be ready to move from Home Station (HS) within three (3) days of effective date of this order. All unit personnel and individuals are ordered to active duty in their current grade and in their present position. All members of unit are ordered to active duty for one hundred eighty (180) days. This order is the HQDA covering directive. Provisions of AR 56-113 and AR 56-335 apply. Files/records disposition will be IAW DA PAM 25-400-2, para 7-1. Records subject to retirement will be transferred to MUSARC to which unit is currently assigned. Unit Commander will use Format 153 to order to active duty unit personnel and individuals.

BNL of Unit	Effective Date (Home Station)	Effective Date (MOB Station)	MOB Station
13TH PO BN (UTL-HAR) 184 BLDG 848 FT. SNELLING, MN 55111-4082	27 Dec 90	30 Dec 90	FT.BRAGG, NC SECOND ARMY

FORMAT: 150

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL

ANDRE
SFC, USA
E, Special Actions Section

DISTRIBUTION:
13TH PO DET (1)
86TH ARCOM (1)
FT BRAGG, NC (1)
FORSCOM, FCJ1 (1)
ARPERCEN (1)
AFKE-PM (1)
AFKE-RM (1)
AFKE-OP (1)
AFKE-LG (1)
Ft. Sheridan, ATTN: AFKE-ZD-PTN (1)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 86TH U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
7402 WEST ROOSEVELT ROAD
FOREST PARK, ILLINOIS 60130-2587

ORDERS 199-02 24 December 1990

13th PSYOP Battalion (WILWA2) 124 Building 506, Fort Snelling, MN 55111-4062

The unit shown and its members have been ordered to active duty for the period indicated unless sooner released or unless extended. The unit enters active duty upon reporting to the home station.

Report to: United States Army Reserve Center, 124 Building 506, Fort Snelling, MN 55111-4062 27 December 1990
Report To: Ft Bragg, NC 30 December 1990
Period: One Hundred Eighty (180) days effective 270630Z Dec 90
Personnel:
Main Body: Annex A
Advance Party: Annex B
Government convoy personnel: Annex C
Road Detachment: Annex D
Personnel authorized individual travel: Annex E
Personnel on initial active duty for training or active duty for training: Annex F
Authority: Permanent Order 144-02, HQs, Fourth U.S. Army, Ft Sheridan, IL 60037-5000, dated 23 December 1990
Movement Designation Code: N/A
Additional Instructions: 2nd PYSOP Group will furnish this Headquarters, a copy of Annexes no later than 30 December 1990. Units located within one day of Mobilization Station will report to Mobilization Station on 29 December 1990.
Format: 153

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
1-13th PSYOP Bn (WILWA2)
1-2nd PSYOP Gp
1-ARPERCEN, ATTN: DARP-MOP
1 Ft Bragg, NC, Cdr, MOB Station
1-FORSCOM, FCJ1
HQs, Fourth U.S. Army, ATTN:
1-AFKR-PR
1-AFKR-RM
1-AFKR-OP
1-AFKR-LG
1-Record Set
1-Background File


****
* OFFICIAL *
* HQs, 86th USARCOM *
****
DENNIS M. GROVER
Military Personnel Officer

Appendix B

Advance Party and Main Body


13TH POB (DET 1)
WTLWA1 Advance Party

TALBOT, Gary E.	MAJ
KLING, Daniel B.	CPT
SAMPSON, Lee E.	CPT
SINNWELL, Donald E.	1LT
CHRIST, Gerhard R.	SFC



13TH POB (DET 2)
WTLWA2

NOLL, James P.	LTC
CADY, Richard D.	CPT
DENZER, Ernest J.	CPT
PRESCOTT, Sanderson	CPT
YOUNG, John B.	CPT
ANDERSON, Rohn	1LT
HARTWIG, Gerald L.	1LT
LEITSCHUH, William M.	1LT
SCULLY, James D.	1LT
SMITH, Lanny R.	CW3
JUBA, David L.	CW2
JONES, Timothy B.	CSM
KAISER, Thomas	SFC
POLLARD, William J.	SFC
REICHLING, John M.	SFC
UBL, John A.	SFC
BENSON, Donald R.	SSG
BOLAND, Thomas B.	SSG
BRYANT, Cedric	SSG
FELTON, Mark A.	SSG
MCQUAID, Daniel A.	SSG
NUCKLES, Bradley	SSG
TAYLOR, Ernest K JR	SSG
GAUL, Robert J.	SGT
CAIN, William T.	SPC
MCSHANE, Charles A.	SPC
THOMAS, Timothy L.	SPC



POS NBR	TITLE	PARA LIN	DMPSC	GR	PMOS	NAME
[illegible]	COMMANDER	101-01	[illegible]	05	11A	LTC NOL[illegible]
[illegible]	S-[illegible]	+ 101-03	[illegible]	04	48[illegible]	MAJ TALBOT
[illegible]	S-[illegible]	+ 101-07	[illegible]	03	35A	CPT SAMPSON
[illegible]	CSM	101-09	00Z50	E9	00Z50	CSM JONES
[illegible]	S-3 AIR (LNO)	104-02	[illegible]	03	11A	CPT PRESCOTT
[illegible]	SENIOR PSYOP SGT	106-02	96F50	E8	96F40	SSG NUCKLES
[illegible]	C-E OFFICER (LNO)	+ 101-04	[illegible]	02	11A	1LT SINWELL
[illegible]	PSYOP OFFICER	105-01	[illegible]	03	38A	CPT DENZER
[illegible]	S-[illegible]	101-06	[illegible]	02	11A	1LT LEITSCHUH
[illegible]	INTERROGATOR	108-02	97E[illegible]	E6	97E[illegible]	SFC UHL
[illegible]	INTERROGATOR	108-05	97E1L	E4	97E10	SPC MCSHANE
[illegible]	INTERROGATOR	108-05A	97E1L	E4		SSG BRYANT
[illegible]	TACTICAL INTEL OFF	105-02	[illegible]	02	35D	1LT ANDERSON
[illegible]	PROPAGANDA OFF	10[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	25A	CPT [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	106-05	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SSG [illegible]
[illegible]	INTERROGATOR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SGT [illegible]
[illegible]	LIAISON OFF	104-01A	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	CW[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]	LIAISON OFF	104-01	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1LT [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

0865	POL MIL AFFAIRS OFF	106/01A	39B00	03	15E	SFC KING
0950	PROPAGANDA OFF	* 107/01A	39B00	03	11A	CWO SMITH
0935	INTERROGATOR	* 106.05B	97E1L	E7	97B4L	SFC REICHLING
0990	PSYOP SPEC	108/06	97E1L	E4	97E2X	SGT GAUL
0940	PSYOP SPEC	108/07	96F1H	E5	96F3X	SSG MCGRATH
0035	S-4	101/08	39B0C	03	21F	SFC FLEMING
0435	SENIOR PSYOP SGT	105/07	96F47	E7	96F40	SSG TAYLOR
0440	PSYOP SPEC	105/04	96F2X	E5	96F3X	SFC SMEISER
0850	PSYOP SPEC	105/06	96F10	E5	96F2X	SSG ROLAND
0840	PSYOP SPEC	105/06A	96F10	E4	96F2X	SFC KAISER

ALTERNATES:

MAJ MORSE

SFC KING

SFC MCNEER

SGT GAUL

SGT THOMAS

SGT BROWN

SFC WINNER

LEGEND

* ALLOWANCE

Appendix C

Attachments at Fort Bragg

18th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY (TAC)(DS)
DEPLOYMENT ROSTER
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

	NAME	Rank/SSN	OVER 40
1.	BARNETT, James E.	[redacted]	
2.	BECK, Rudolph O.	[redacted]	
3.	BOPP, Jeffrey L.	SPC/[redacted]	
4.	EISELE, Wilhelm E.	SFC/[redacted]	
5.	HOUSE, Terry L.	SSG/[redacted]	
6.	KENNEDY, Michael C.	SGT/[redacted]	
7.	KRATZ, Brian D.	SP4/[redacted]	
8.	LEACH, Aron	SGT/[redacted]	X
9.	McNEILLY, William	SP4/[redacted]	
10.	MACK, John L.	SGT/[redacted]	X
11.	REYES, Mario J.	SP4/[redacted]	
12.	SCHOELCH, John R.	SGT/[redacted]	X
13.	SPARLING, Dana E.	SSG/[redacted]	
14.	Willingham, Alberto	SSG/[redacted]	
15.	WOODWORTH, Mark G.	SP4/[redacted]	

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILBERT E. HAAS
MSG, USAR
Senior Training NCO

To 4th PYOP
Maj Jones

DET 1, 19TH PSYOP CO.
BLDG 500, FT SNELLING
ST PAUL, MN 55111

ALPHA ROSTER

	NAME	RANK	SSN	MOS
1	ANDERSON, FRAG E.	SPC	[redacted]	96F
2	DOSBAL, DALE L.	SSG	[redacted]	96T
3	DUFFY, BRETT W.	SGT	[redacted]	96F
4	EASTLUND, DAVID L.	SGT	[redacted]	96F
5	ERWIN, ROBERT A.	SGT	[redacted]	96F
6	FILLBRANDT, DAVID S.	SGT	[redacted]	96F
7	GODBOUT, GEORGE T.	CPT	[redacted]	11A
8	HORTON, CHESTER V.	PFC	[redacted]	31V
9	JOHNSON, ERIC A.	SPC	[redacted]	96F
10	KING, JAMES T.	SSG	[redacted]	96F
11	OTT, WILLIAM E.	SPC	[redacted]	96F
12	SHULTZ, MARK A.	SPC	[redacted]	96F
13	SLICHTER, DAVID L.	SPC	[redacted]	96F
14	TRETTER, WALTER F.	SGT	[redacted]	96U
15	WIDDOM, DANG A.	SSG	[redacted]	96F

RONALD D. MUR[illegible]
MAJ, AR, USAR
Commanding

ANNEX B (Advance Party) 244 Psyop Co
ORDERS 112-6, HQS, 90TH US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND dtd 24 DEC 90 (Continued)
TYPE OF TRAVEL: Commercial Air
PERIOD: 180 days

1LT	CHEEK, Donald J	[redacted]
SFC	DUNN, Lynn F	[redacted]
SFC	ESCAMILLA, Richard J	[redacted]
SSG	ANDERSON, Trygve E	[redacted]
SSG	DEFOOR, Jimmy D	[redacted]
SSG	RIOS, Alfredo P	[redacted]
SSG	TYLER, Revis D III	[redacted]
SSG	WEAVER, Jackie F	[redacted]
SGT	GULLO, Ramazan	[redacted]
SGT	PEKOWSKI, Edward J	[redacted]
SPC	ALLISON, Michael R	[redacted]
SPC	BRAMLETT, Cliff E	[redacted]
SPC	HART, Clarence L	[redacted]
SPC	SMITH, Douglas E	[redacted]
SPC	ZARATE, Paul D	[redacted]

James D Gryder

AUTHENTICATED BY: JAMES D GRYDER
MAJ, MP, USAR
Commanding

PAGE 1 OF 1

245TH PO DETACH (A)

	GRADE	NAME	SSN
1.	SGT	ABBOTT, WAYNE T.	[redacted]
2.	SPC	AMBROSIO, CHRISTOPHER H.	
3.	SGT	BROOKS, RICHARD E.	
4.	SPC	CARTIER, JON A.	
5.	SPC	CASANOVA, JOSE H.	
6.	SGT	CLAYTOR, CHARLES A.	
7.	SSG	EVANS, LAMAR D.	
8.	SSG	GALVAN, ERNESTO A.	
9.	SPC	GREENLEE, JOHN M.	
10.	SGT	LAMB, DAVID W.	
11.	SPC	MCCOY, DARRELL L.	
12.	SSG	NELSON, JEFFREY H.	
13.	SPC	PARKS, SHAWN P.	
14.	SGT	PEARSON, ASA E.	
15.	CPT	RICHARDSON, JAMES R.	
16.	SFC	RICHARDSON, LESTER G.	
17.	SGT	TRAMMELL, WILLIAM L.	
18.	SGT	WHITE, RONALD L.	

ANNEX C (Government Convoy Personnel) to Order 11[illegible],
HQ USCOM, dated 14 Dec 90
PURPOSE: Desert Shield
PERIOD: 180 days BEGIN DATE: 22 Dec 90
Report to MOB Station: 30 Dec 90
Unit: Detachment 1, 362d PSYOP Co (WSOWA1), 1616 N. Woolsey Ave,
Fayetteville, AR 72703

RANK/NAME	SSN	HOME ADDRESS
CPT ELDON D. PENCE III	[redacted]	[redacted]
MSG BOBBY G. HARWELL	[redacted]	[redacted]
SSG JAMES E. SILKWOOD	[redacted]	[redacted]
SSG GARY G. MCGARRAH	[redacted]	[redacted]
SSG LINCOLN C. PEARSON	[redacted]	[redacted]
SGT JOHN C. SLAMONS	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC KEITH T. PIGG	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC KENNETH W. COLYAR	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC DONALD C. TIPPETT	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC CHARLES E. BRAMMER	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC [illegible] L. ANDERSON	[redacted]	[redacted]
SPC [illegible] G. MILLER	[redacted]	[redacted]
SGT JOHNNY D. MCMILLAN	[redacted]	[redacted]

ANNEX B (Advance [illegible]) to [illegible],
90th ARCOM, dated [illegible] Dec 90
PURPOSE: Desert Shield
PERIOD: 180 days BEGIN DATE: 27 Dec 90
Report to MOB Station: 29 Dec 90
Unit: Detachment 1, 362d PSYOP Co (WSQWA1), 1616 N. Woolsey Ave, Fayetteville, AR 72703

RANK/NAME	SSN	HOME ADDRESS
SFC LARRY D. PERKINS	[redacted]	[redacted]
SFC LESTER D. CAUDLE	[redacted]	[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ORDERS 66-114 7 March 1991

JONES, TIMOTHY B. [redacted] CSM 13th PO Bn (WTLWAA) St Paul, MN 55111-4062 with duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000

You are reassigned as indicated below. No travel involved.

Assigned to: United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (WZVNAA) Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000
Reporting date: 15 January 1991, Vocal Orders of the Mobilization Commander, date confirmed.
Movement Designator Code: MZE1
Additional instructions: (a) Assignment is in accordance with FORSCOM message 222200Z OCT 90, Subject: Management of Non-deployables.
(b) Soldier is assigned pending further disposition and is for duty with 4th PO Gp.
Format: 429

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cecelia D. Johnson, CPT.
MICHAEL A. BEACH
for MAJ, AG
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

DISTRIBUTION:
REC SET (2)
AFZA-AG-OMO (1)
CDR, RC BRAGG (1)
CDR, 108TH CFG (1)
CDR, 13TH PO BN, APO NY 09657 (1)
CDR, USACAPOC, FT BRAGG, NC 28307-5000 (1)
CDR, USAMEDDAC, FT BRAGG, NC 28307-5000 (1)
DIRECTORATE OF RESERVE COMPONENT (1)
DEH HOUSING DIVISION BILLETING BRANCH (1)
CSM JONES (5)

Appendix D

Reassignment of Injured Personnel

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
13TH PSYCOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BN(PW)
BUILDING 506, FORT SNELLING
SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA 55111-4062

AFKE-AC-IL-MPY-AB 9 January 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: G-1, Personnel, USACAPOC, ATTEN: AORC-PE (LTC Ellis),

Ft. Bragg, NC 28307

1. REFERENCE Briefings to CG, USACAPOC 8 Jan 91, Desert Shield Validation of 13th PSYOP BN DETs #1 & #2.

2. As per standards specified in the Desert Shield MOI dtd 2 OCT 90 and guidance received from BG Hurteau during the above reference, the below listed soldiers are declared non-deployable.

NAME	RANK	MOS	Para/Line	Reason
Talbot, Gary E.	MAJ	13A/39B	101/03	APFT Failure/ OVERWEIGHT
JONES, Timothy B.	CSM	ØØZ5Ø	101/09	APFT Failure/ OVERWEIGHT

3. Initial coordination is in progress between myself and COL Perry, Commander, 2nd PSYOP Gp, in conjunction with my full-time support staff to replace these two soldiers immediately. Request assistance from the G-1, USACAPOC to expedite orders to accomplish the following actions:

a. To reassign the two non-deployable soldiers.

b. To bring replacements for the two non-deployable soldiers to active duty.

4. Point of contact this headquarters is CPT Prescott (SSG Nuckles).

JAMES P. NOLL
LTC, IN
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5000

ORDERS 66-112

7 March 199

TALBOT, GARY E. [redacted] MAJ 13th PO Bn (WTLWAA) St Paul, MN 55111-404
with duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000

You are reassigned as indicated below. No travel involved.

Assigned to: United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (WTVNAA) Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000
Reporting date: 15 January 1991, Verbal Orders of the Mobilization [illegible] date confirmed.
Movement Designator Code: NZ01
Additional instructions: (a) Assignment is in accordance with FORSCOM message 2222002 OCT 90, Subject: Management of Non-deployables.
(b) Soldier is assigned pending further disposition and is for adm. with 4th PO Gp.
Format: 420

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charlie A. Johnson, CPT
for [illegible]
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

DISTRIBUTION:
REC SET (2)
AFZA-AG-OMO (1)
CDR, 96 BRAGG (1)
CDR, 16TH CPG (1)
CDR, 13TH PO BN, APO NY 09657 (1)
CDR, USACAPOC, FT BRAGG, NC 28307-5000 (1)
CDR, USAMEDDAC, FT BRAGG, NC 28307-5000 (1)
DIRECTORATE OF RESERVE COMPONENT (1)
DPH HOUSING DIVISION BILLETING BRANCH (1)
MAJ TALBOT (5)

Appendix E

Assignment of Replacement for Command Sergeant Major (CSM)

Appendix F

Written Special Operations Forces (SOF) Validation Test

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY
CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE)
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307-5200

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AORC-PE

10 JANUARY 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, PERSCOM, ATTN: PAPC-OPP, ATTN. CPT MONEY, 200 STOVALL STREET, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332-0400

SUBJECT: Request for Temporary Tour of Active Duty in Support of Desert Shield

1. Brigadier General Joseph C. Burteau, Commanding General, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command (USACAPOC), has requested a Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) be granted SGM Robert S. McCarter, [redacted], to replace CSM Timothy B. Jones, who has been declared non-deployable by the Fort Bragg, NC Mobilization Station.

2. Because of time constraints of SGM McCarter's deployment date, is is further requested that his TTAD order be effective 10 January 1991.

3. POC this headquarters, SGM De Lay, AV: 432-9484.

FOR
HIRAM R. ELLIS
LTC, EN
ASST G-1

1 Encl

APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX J: CA/PSYOP Combat Leaders' Test

CERTIFICATION/VALIDATION TEST

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. List the five headings of the PSYOP Estimate.

2. What is the purpose of the PSYOP Annex and who develops it?

3. What is the purpose of the PSYOP Situation Report and who develops it?

4. List five PSYOP unit teams.

5. What is the purpose of the Target Analysis Worksheet?

6. What is the purpose of the Campaign Control Sheet?

The following Questions have been added and are REQUIRED for Operation DESERT SHIELD Validation:

7. Who determines theater-level psychological operations policy?

8. Who derives the overall psychological operations mission?

9. List four sources of intelligence used in PSYOP planning.

10. Describe the basic structure of an L-series TOE Tactical Support Company.

11. What are the basic capabilities of the MSQ-85 Audio-Visual System?

12. What are two applications of PSYOP in FID/UW operations?

13. What is the critical first step in the Product (Propaganda) Development Process?

14. What actions take place in a Product Development Center?

15. Describe five methods of PSYOP dissemination.

16. What are the general responsibilities of the PSYOP LNO/Staff Officer at a maneuver Division HQ?

APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX J: CA/PSYOP Combat Leaders' Test (Continued)

17. Who participates in the Campaign Approval and Final Product Approval process?

18. What is the purpose of the Product Pre-Test?

19. What type of unit possesses Medium Print capability? Who do they normally support?

20. Describe the L-series TOE structure of a PSYOP battalion headquarters.

21. What PSYOP dissemination means are appropriate for the CENTCOM area?

22. What is the single most influential social factor in Arab life?

DENZER

1. 1. [redacted]ission
   2. The [redacted]tuation and considerations
   3. [redacted]nalysis of courses of action
   4. [redacted]omparision of [redacted]ourses of action
   5. [redacted]onclusions

2. A Psyop Annex expresses the commanders decision AND concept of the operation as it pertains to Psyop. The supported unit G3 is responsible for the preparation of the Psyop Annex to the OPLAN/OPORD. It is usually [redacted] section and in close coordination with the supporting Psyop unit commander and other staff sections.

3. The purpose of the Psyop situation report is to provide current information to the supported unit S3/G3/J3 and other Psyop planners about enemy PSYWAR activities and the apparent impact of friendly Psyop activities. The Sitrep is [redacted] Psyop unit.

4. L series: [redacted] Section/Center/ Team Test and evaluation tm, Interrogation/Debriefing Team, [redacted] Team, Threat Analysis team, Collection Management and Dissemination Section, Counter-Propaganda Team, Tactical Dissemination Platoon, Audio-visual Team, [redacted] (Heavy/Medium/Light) [redacted] (Platoon/Section/Team).

5. The target analysis worksheet serves as an advance planning tool to evaluate tentative target audiences in a systematic manner. This is done by relating the external influences that have an effect on the target audience to the psychological objective(s). [redacted] Campaign Control Sheet.


6. The campaign control sheet provides a planning guide to assist Psyop planners in organizing and controlling a compaign after the target audiences have been identified and the Psychological objectives have been determined. It also reflects the effectiveness of the ongoing Psyop compaign as indicated by collected information and intelligence and reflects changes to the campaign to increase the Psyop impact.

7. When a theater of operations has been established and authority to conduct Psyop has been granted to the theater commander, national policy for Psyop is received for implementation in the theater formJCS. The theater commander is responsible for organizing Psyop assets in the theater and assuring that Psyop is consonant with national policy. National Psyop policy guidance for all areas is developed by the National Command Authority under the President.

8. The supporting Psyop unit commander and staff derives the Psyop mission from the mission of the supported unit. The Psyop unit mission is often derived using the Psyop estimate, and the decision of the supported unit commander concerning the Psyop mission is communicated to the supporting Psyop unit commander via the Psyop annex.

9. EPWs, civilian internees, detained persons, refugees, displaced persons
local residents,
Battlefield intelligence reporting (Spot/Salute reports)
Signals intelligence (Intercept, Jamming, DF reports)
Imagery intelligence
Captured enemy documents and materiel
Counter intelligence

10.



11. The MSQ-85 Mobile Audio Visual shelter has the capability to record reproduce, and broadcast audio messages over loudspeaker with organic equipment; to record, reproduce and show television/video tape programs to small audiences; to show sound/silent motion pictures to large or small audiences; and to facilitate the conduct of face-to-face Psyop for large or small audiences.

12. -To establish, spread adn maintain belief and support for the friendly political system including its ideology, infrastructure and plitical programs

-Mobilizing popular support for militray, paramilitary, security, and intellegence operations, such as obtaining recruits, information and safe houses for UW forces.

-Propagandizing the anticipated reforms and programs to benefit the populace once the hostile government is over thrown.

-Shifting the loyalty of enemy forces and their supporters to friendly control.

13. The critical first step in the Propaganda Development Process is analysis of the supported units mission.

14. Assist in anaylsis of supported unit mission, assist in preparation of Psyop estimates and annexes, analyze intelligence in support of Psyop effort, conduct target analysis, conduct campaign control, develop Psyop products, conduct Pre-Post test of Psyop products, assess impact of friendly Psyop effort, analyze enemy propaganda to deveop counter propaganda

15. o Face-to-face communication

o Loudspeacker

o Radio

o Television/motion picture

o Print media

16. o Conduct pre-liaison coordination to determine requirements.

o Report to the supported units, parent Psyop unit and others as required

o Conduct on site liaison coordination, to include HN support

o Assist supported unit in preparation of estimates, annexes and plans


o Accomplishes post-liaison activities to include briefings and reports

17. Participants in the Campaign Approval and Final Product Approval process include the supported unit commander, other US and allied units and agencies who require campaign coordination, US State Department and Host Nation country teams when necessary.

18. The product Pretest is conducted to ensure that the products message will be interpreted by the target audience as intended by the product developers.

19. The operational support company possesses medium print capability and normally supports division/corps level operations.

20.



21. (Most appropiate to least appropriate)
Loudspeaker, Radio, TV, Face-to-face, Print

22. Religion is the single most influential socila factor in Arab life; specifically; the religions of Islam dominates all aspects of Arab life.

Appendix G

Camp Team Configuration

13th POB – OPERATION DESERT STORM
TASK ORGANIZATION

COMMAND AND CONTROL TEAM
(800th MP BDE)

LTC JAMES NOLL	18B/35A
CPT SANDY PRESCOTT	18B
CPT LEE SAMPSON	35D
CPT ERNIE DENZER	39B/38A
1LT DONALD SINNWELL	25A
1LT DAVID COLE	39B/11B
2LT AHMAD H. AL–SAYEGH, KUWAIT ARMY	
CSM ROBERT McCARTER	18Z5O
SGT FRANCIS McDONALD	76Y2O
SGT KATHRYN CONTI	97E3L
SPC WENDY DAIGLE	97E1L
SPC MARY FINNERAN	97E1L

EAST CAMP

CAMP TEAM ONE
(403rd MP CAMP)

1LT WILLIAM LEITSCHUH	31A
SFC JOHN UBL	96F4O
SFC MICHAEL MARCIELLO	97E4L
SSG CEDRIC BRYANT	96F3O
SGT JAMES OPPENHEIMER	97E3L
SPC MARK GESJEY	97E1L
SPC CHARLES McSHANE	97E1L

CAMP TEAM TWO
(401st MP CAMP)

CPT RICHARD CADY	21J
1LT ROHN ANDERSON	35D/39B
CW3 DAVID JUBA	351BO
SFC WILLIAM POLLARD	96F40
SSG EMORY CHECK	97E3L
SSG WILFRED COTE	97E3L
SGT MARK FELTON	97E20
SPC KENNETH MALCOLM	97E10
2LT YOUSEF A. BENEED, KUWAIT ARMY	
PFC FAHAH M. AL–DHAFIRI, KUWAIT ARMY	
2LT MANE M. ALAJMI, KUWAIT ARMY	
PFC FALAH O. ALANAEZY, KUWAIT ARMY	
PFC ABDULKARIM AL–OTAIBI, KUWAIT ARMY	
SMG Saad Al–Sahli, K.S.A Forces	
MSG Solymon Al–Gamany, K.S.A. Forces	

CAMP TEAM FIVE
(GS TO TEAMS 1 AND 2)

CPT JOHN YOUNG	35E/35D
SFC THOMAS KAISER	96F4O
SFC GERHARD CHRIST	97E4L
SSG THOMAS BOLAND	96F3O
SSG ERNEST "BUTCH" TAYLOR	96F3O
SSG Gregory Parmele, 9th POB	
SPC Randel Olson, 9th POB	
MSG Abdullah M. Aliahmary, K.S.A. Forces	
MAJ Abdul M. Al–Harbi, Kuwait Army	

338th MID ENROUTE TO KHOBAR
(RELEASED FROM WEST CAMP)

SFC RAUL JIMENEZ–CINTRON	97E4O
SSG ANGEL CHEVRESTT	97E3O
SGT GARY FRASKE	97E2O
SFC STANLEY SHALE	97E4O
SGT KIM EMERLING	11C2O
SGT HAROLD RANNE AD	97E2O

WEST CAMP

CAMP TEAM THREE
(301st MP CAMP)

1LT GERALD HARTWIG	13D
1LT JAMES SCULLY	39B
SSG DONALD BENSON	96F3O
SPC WILLIAM CAIN	96F1O
SPC TIM THOMAS	96F1O
SFC Roger Travis, 9th POB	
SGT Thomas Miller, 9th POB	
SPC Mark Singleton, 9th POB	
SPC Myron George, 9th POB	
SPC Bradkey Layne, 9th POB	

CAMP TEAM FOUR
(402nd MP CAMP)

CPT DANIEL KLING	11A
CW3 LANNY SMITH	351EO
SFC JOHN REICHLING	96F4O
SSG DANIEL McQUAID	96F3L
SGT ROBERT GAUL	97E2L
SGT Leon Gooden, 9th POB	
SPC William Pyne, 9th POB	
SPC Bradley Shumaker, 9th POB	

ATTACHED TO 9TH BOB

SSG BRADLEY NUCKLES	97E3L

COMMENTS

Total assigned and attached = 68
3 Kuwaiti's on leave

All Information Current as of 28–Mar–91

Appendix H

Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Rules

لوائح وقواعد معسكرات اعتقال اسرى الحرب

- ابتعد عن الحواجز ثلاث أمتار
- ضع كل المهملات في الأوعية المعدة لذلك . - يجب إعادة كل أواني الأكل بعد الانتهاء منها
- لا يسمح بتجمعات كبيرة من الأسرى في أي مكان وفي أي وقت .
- تفادياً للأمراض يجب استخدام المراحيض
- الفي التحية العسكرية على جميع الضباط . - تطفأ جميع الأنوار في الساعة العاشرة مساءً
- يجب تواجد جميع الأسرى في أماكنهم في الساعة العاشرة مساءً
- يجب بقاء جميع الأسرى في أماكنهم حتى الساعة الخامسة صباحاً
- يجب أن تكون بطاقات الهوية في حيازة الأسرى في كل الأوقات
- يجب على جميع الأسرى الامتناع عن توجيه عبارات سيئة لأفراد المعسكر
- الحالات الطبية الطارئة التي لا يمكن علاجها بواسطة الفريق الطبي للأسرى يجب اعلام الحراس عنها
- القمار (الميسر) ممنوع منعاً باتاً
- حيازة أو شرب المشروبات الروحية / الكيمائية ممنوع منعاً باتاً . - حيازة الأسلحة ممنوع منعاً باتاً

إن عدم مراعاة التعليمات الموضحة عاليه سوف يترتب عليها إجراءات نظامية تشمل ما يلي :

• الغرامات • الحرمان من الامتيازات • القيام بأعمال النظافة وغيرها • غذاء محدود (غير كاف)

PRISONER OF WAR HOLDING COMPOUND RULES AND REGULATIONS

* Do not cross the three-meters barrier.
* Place all trash in the containers provided. * Obey all orders immediately and without failure.
* All eating utensils must be returned after meals.
* No large groups of prisoners may be gathered at any place at any time.
* In order to avoid disease, latrines will be used.
* Salute all officers. * All lights will be extinguished by 2200 hours
* All prisoners must be in quarters at 2200 hours.
* All prisoners must remain in quarters until 0500 hours.
* All prisoners must have identification in their possession at all times.
* Prisoners are forbidden to direct derogatory comments toward camp personnel.
* Medical emergencies that cannot be treated by PW medical personnel should be brought to the guards' attention.
* Gambling is strictly forbidden.
* Possession and consumption of intoxicating beverages/chemicals is strictly forbidden.
* Possession of weapons is strictly forbidden.

Failure to comply with the above listed rules will result in disciplinary action. Such action may include

* Fines * Withdrawal of privileges * Fatigues duty * Restricted diet

جدول المواعيد Activities scheduled


أ) الاستيقاظ - الساعة ٥ صباحاً
ب) عملية حصر الحضور - الساعة ٥,٣٠ صباحاً
جـ) الإفطار - الساعة ٥,٤٥
د) عملية تسوية وصيانة المعسكر - الساعة ٦,٣٠
هـ) بيان تفاصيل العمل - الساعة ٧,٣٠
و) العيادة عند بوابة المعسكر - الساعة ٧,٣٠
ز) عملية حصر الحضور - الساعة ١١,٤٥ ظهراً
حـ) وجبة الغذاء - الساعة ١٢,٠٠ ظهراً
ط) عملية حصر الحضور - الساعة ٤,٤٥ عصراً
ي) وجبة العشاء - الساعة ٥,٠٠ مساءً
ك) كافة الأسرى يكونون في المعسكر - الساعة ٧ مساء (ما عدا الأوقات الخاصة بمتطلبات الحمامات والنظام الصحي الأخرى)
ل) إطفاء الأنوار الساعة ١٠ مساءً - يظل أسرى الحرب في مضاجعهم بين الساعة ١٠ مساءً والخامسة صباحاً

إعـــلان Notice

المعتقلون الذين رغم معتقداتهم الدينية أو السياسية ، يرون أن حياتهم في خطر ، أو أنهم سوف يتعرضون لإصابات جسدية على أيدي الأسرى الآخرين عليهم القيا بالتبليغ عن هذه الحالة شخصياً إلى أي ضابط في الجيش الأمريكي في هذا المعسكر دون استشارة مندوب المعتقلين . ومن ذلك الوقت فصاعداً، سوف يقوم قائد المعسكر بتأمين الحماية الكافية لهؤلاء المعتقلين ، إما بالفصل بينهم وبين الآخرين أو نقلهم أو أي وسائل أخرى . وسوف يعاقب المعتقلون الذين يسيئون معاملة زملائهم المعتقلين .

القـائـد


توجيه أسرى الحرب



انتم أسرى حرب، اعتقلتكم القوات المسلحة الأمريكية وخلال وجودكم هنا، فسوف تتمتعون بكل الحقوق والامتيازات كأسرى حرب طبقاً لاتفاقيات جنيف . كما أنكم أثناء وجودكم هنا سوف تخضعون للوائح ونظم هذا المعسكر، طبقاً لما تقره تلك الاتفاقيات وسوف يمثلكم مندوبكم في كل ا[illegible] بالاتكم لدى القيادة والحراس وإن أي طلب، أو مشكلة، أو أمور ترغبون في التقدم بها إلى هذه الهيئة المندوب هو قائدكم، وسوف يمثلكم ويذوب عنكم، ويزودكم بالمعلومات في جميع الأوقات. ولن يسمح لكم بمندوب آخر كما لن يسمح لكم باختيار مشرفين آخرين لتولي قيادتكم .

يجب مراعاة القواعد الآتية بكل عناية. إنها تتعلق بأمن هذا المعسكر وعليكم معرفتها وفهمها واطاعتها .


لا تقترب أو تدنو من العاملين في هذه الهيئة أو الحراس (حوالي ست خطوات) وإن كان لابد أن تلفت انتباهه لا يجب أن تقترب من الخلف، واجهه، وقف بانتباه. وسوف يتعرف عليك ويعطيك التعليمات عن الخطوة التالية .



عند عزف سلامنا الوطني أثناء تواجدك خارج المباني، قف بانتباه حتى اتمام العزف .


سوف يجيب مندوبك على جميع ما لديك من أسئلة وسوف يسجل قائمة بالأسئلة التي لا يستطيع الاجابة عليها، ويحصل على الاجابات مني .





كن بعيداً عن الأسوار في كل الأوقات وإذا ما اقتربت كثيراً فسوف يتم تحذيرك استجب لتحذير وتعليمات الحارس وإذا لم تذعن أو جريت فسوف يطلق عليك الرصاص .

انك تحمل بطاقة (هوية) . احتفظ بها في كل الأوقات ويمكن أن يطلب منك ابرازها نهاراً أو ليلاً فإذا لم تكن معك فسوف تفقد جميع الامتيازات أو تتعرض لكل أنواع العقوبات وفي حالة فقدها فيجب الابلاغ عنها في الحال للمندوب .



اطع جميع الأوامر الصادرة من الأبراج، وحراس الأسوار أو أفراد الهيئة. وإذا لم تفهمه، واجهه، وقف انتباه وسوف يعطيك تعليمات، أو يسير اليك، أو يطلب مترجماً .

لا يجب العبث بلوحة الإعلانات ولا يجب تغييرها بأي طريقة إنها مصدر معلوماتك. ان ممثل اسرى الحرب وانا هما الشخصان المصرح لهما بتعليق، أو إزالة النشرات أو تعديلها بأي أسلوب .



لا تحري داخل المعسكر ولا يسمح بممارسة تمارين أو أنواع أخرى من التدريبات . سوف تعد لكم أماكن ووقت للترفيه .

لا يسمح بالصراخ، والغناء أو أي أنواع أخرى من المزاح الخشن داخل المعسكر .

قم بتسليم كل الأدوات وأي شيء تعثر عليه أو يقع في حيازتك بخلاف ما هو مسموح لك بحيازته . التسليم يكون لمندوبك .

Appendix I

Attached Kuwaiti and Saudi Special Forces (SF) Personnel

APPENDIX B-3

ALLIED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN

Saudi Arabia

CPT Tariq Mohamnad Al Kahtoni
CPT Abdallah Ahmad Al Amri
1LT Khatnan Halael Alotabi
1LT Said Ahmad Al Kahtoni

CWO Saad Al-Sahli

SSG Souleymon Al-Gamany
SSG Abdullah H. Aliahmary
SPC Alishmsi Al-O-Mari


Kuwait

MAJ Abdul M. Al-Harbi
2LT Ahand H. Al-Sayegh
2LT Mane M. Alajmi
2LT Yousef A. Beneed
Volunteer/PFC Falah O. Alanaezy
Volunteer/PFC Fahad M. Al-Dhafiri
Volunteer/PFC Abdulkarim Al-Otaibi

Appendix J

Psyop Leaflet

Invitation



"PSYOP Leaflets speaking of plentiful food and water caused soldiers to desert to the South..."
-An Iraqi Division Commander

Below:

"From HQ Joint Forces and Theater of Operations. You are invited to join the Joint Forces and enjoy full Arab hospitality, security, safety and medical care. You will return to your homes as soon as the situation that Saddam has placed us in has ended. My brother Iraqi soldier... this invitation is open to you and your comrade soldiers. We hope you will accept this invitation as soon as you have the opportunity.

Commander, Joint Forces and Theater of Operations"



Appendix K

Legal Opinion on Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Use

CCJA 11 February 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP (AIRBORNE), APO NEW YORK 09772

SUBJECT: Request For Legal Opinion (U)

1. (C) We have reviewed the issue presented in your 8 February 1991 request for a legal opinion regarding the legal paramenters for audio and audio-visual coverage of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). In formulating our response, we note the impact of the following legal and policy factors:

a. (U) Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War which provides that EPWs must be protected from "insults and public curiosity" (tab A);

b. (U) Paragraph 2-15, Army Regulation 190-8 which provides that EPWs will not be photographed except in support of medical documentation, for official documentation, or for other purposes specifically described in the regulation (tab B);

c. (C) USCINCCENT direction on 12 January 1991 for the psychological "exploitation" of volunteer EPWS; and

d. (U) OASD(PA) guidance to CCPA of 2 February 1991 which discouraged the use of photography to portray the humane treatment of EPWs (tab C).

2. (C) Audio Recording. We do not consider the voluntary participation of EPWs in recording messages as subjecting EPWS to "public curiosity". Nor are the proscriptions of AR 190-8 violated as they apply only to photography and news media interviews. We recommend that the voluntary consent of the EPW to the tape recording be documented to allow review if requested by ICRC representatives. The EPW must be allowed to revoke any consent granted.

3. (U) Video Recording.

a. (C) Photography of EPWs is a more sensitive issue. It is asserted that a video of EPW camp conditions and quality of life would be in the best interests of coalition efforts. Such a video could be used to dispel Iraqi fears regarding treatment upon capture. On the other hand, there are several disadvantages to be overcome. The International Committee of the Red Cross has opined that any photography of EPWs is prohibited. The United States position however is that the Geneva Convention does not preclude all public display of EPWs. The United States does not view photographs or footage indicating that EPWs have been caught or to show how well they are being treated as a violation of Article 13 of the EPW Convention.

b. (C) AR 190-8 is however more restrictive than Geneva Convention requirements and precludes photography of EPWs except under the conditions set forth in paragraph 2-15. The proposed video photography is not one of the permitted activities and would require an exception from HQDA.

c. (C) As noted in the OASD(PA) memorandum, any photography of EPWs could result in Iraqi charges of using EPWs in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Public broadcast of EPW camp video would also likely provoke additional media requests for access to EPWs camps with the attendant problems of ensuring individual EPWs were not photographed. The right of the American public and the world to know that EPWs are being afforded their rights under the Convention can be ensured by the means provided for in the Convention, i.e. inspections by the ICRC.

4. (C) In summary, we have no legal objection to EPWs voluntarily agreeing to make audio recordings. While not illegal per se, the disadvantages associated with the videotaping of EPWs outweigh the advantages. We do not recommend that videotaping of EPWs be pursued at this time.


5. (U) Our POC is MAJ Fletcher, 476-4466, ext. 125.

3 Encl
as

RAYMOND G. RUPPERT
COL, USA
Staff Judge Advocate

Appendix L

Camp Locations and Distances


HAFAR AL BATIN
4MI
5 MI
AL QUAYSUMAH
FUEL POINT
WEST EPW CAMP
40 MI.
56 MI.
34 MI
AL WARIAH LANDING STRIP
TO KHAFJI
34 MI.
NUAYRIYAH
ABU HADRIYAH
6 MI
CSC WOMBAT
50 MI.
NITA
AL JUBAYL
97 MI
UMM AL JAMAJIM
SARRAR
DAMMAM
AL ARTAWIYAH
5 Mi.
KFIA
KHOBAR
TO UBSSIM
CSC BULL RUN
EAST EPW CAMP
FUEL
30 MI.
DHAHRAN INT'L AIRPOR
CSC PULASKI
AL MAJMA'AH
URIAURAH
90 MI.
120 MI.
URIAURAH EXIT
CSC PALERMO
40 MI.
THUMAMA
CSC STAGECOACH
RIYADH INT'L AIRPORT
10 MI
100 MI.
RIYADH
TO KHARJ
N

Appendix M

Request for Augmentation

AFKE-AC-IL-MPY-AA-CO 25 February 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne)

SUBJECT: Request for Force Augmentation

1. Due to the increased projections of PWs as of 25 FEB 91, I am requesting your personal assistance towards gaining approval of the previously requested "Plus Up" to the 13th POB (PW).

2. The 800th MP Bde Commander is also actively pursuing this request through his channels.

3. With such a tremendous increase in the projected number of EPWs, the mission of the 13th POB (PW) will be of paramount importance to the 800th MP Bde, particularly in the control and pacification roles. The more logistical and administrative problems encountered by the MPs, the greater the responsibility shouldered by the 13th POB (PW) to elicit cooperation and gain/maintain control of the PWs. The potential embarrassment to the US due to the overwhelming numbers of PWs may be prevented greatly through the use of PSYOP from the force multiplier aspect. We have the opportunity to prevent such problems before they start, and to insure that the US forces handling PWs continue to comply with the Geneva accords and host nation agreements.

4. Another solution, less desireable however, would be to assign mounted loudspeaker teams to assist in these missions. The attachment of ten mounted loudspeaker teams should prove sufficient, contingent of course, on the availability of these assets due to the tactical situation.

JAMES P. NOLL
LTC IN
Commanding

Appendix N

338th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment

DRAFT

TO: Commander

800th MP Brigade

FROM: Commander

13th PSYOP Battalion

SUBJECT: Request for Additional Personnel

1. The 13th PSYOP Battalion requests additional personnel to augment the Battalion due to increased mission requirements of OPERATION DESERT STORM.

2. The following battalion sections require personnel to fulfill mission requirements. Personnel to fill these requirements are members of the 13th PSYOP Battalion or subordinate units.

A. Command Section: Personnel: 01

Executive Officer

B. S-1 Section: Personnel: 05

S-1 Officer

PSNCO

Clerk Typist (2 each)

Personnel Admin Specialist

C. S-4 Section: Personnel: 03

S-4 Officer

Property Book NCO

Supply Sgt

D. Maintenance Section: Personnel: 02

Light Wheel Vehicle Mechanic (2 each)

E. Audio/Visual: Personnel: 04

Team Chief

PSYOP Specialist (3 each)

F. Print: Personnel: 07

Offset Press Specialist (4 each)

Illustrator

Photo and Layout Specialist

Still Photographer

Bindery Specialist

G. Camp Team Augmentation: Personnel: 20

PSYOP Specialist (30F) (10 each)

Interrogator (97E) (5 each)

3. The 13th POB also requests two HB (Loudspeaker) Detachments consisting of 18 personnel each. The detachments would consist of the following:

A. Command and Control: Personnel: 03

PSYOP Officer

PSYOP Specialist

Communications Maintenance Specialist (31V)

B. HB Teams (5 each Teams) Personnel: 15

4. All personnel and mission equipment are needed immediately for successful mission accomplishment.

JAMES P. NOLL
LTC (P), IN
Commanding

Bedding field came in two wks ago & said priority in airflow would go to combat units or wer stoppers.

Need a very strong statement if we want to get more soldiers. Original justification by Conlin did not show a compelling need.

POTF put a cover letter on it & Dehays reviewed & gave it back to LTC Jones & LTC Jones strengthened it & it went in to Bedding field. ARCENT BSTB offices

Bedding field used to be the ARCENT G3 but ~~#~~ 3 now 3rd men down on chain since I up. A cranky old man.

ARCENT has had to have a special meeting to solve mp camp problems, with ARCENT PMO.

A swap out is occurring to modernize & there is a suplus of 1009's as HMMV's are brought in. We can reduce the veh. airlift & get the bodies here easier.

Increased requirements based on additional mission requirements req. 800th mission in K. City.

Contact ARCENT SUPCOM on the availability of CUCV's

Appendix O

To Kuwait City - 15 speaker team augmentation

Copy for Commander
LTC Noll

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
13TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO NY 09618

AFKE-ACIL-MPY-AA-CO 10 March, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR G-1 800TH MP BDE (PW)

SUBJECT; Personnel Roster of SM Re-deploying with the Unit.

1. For your information, attached is a list of 15 enlisted soldiers from the 338th MID that are currently attached to the 13th POB.

2. It is our understanding that prior to re-deployment, the 338th will be attached directly to the 800th and that all re-deployment planning and execution will be conducted by the 800th.

3. POC is CPT Denzer, 899-1119 ext 7480.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Ernest J. Denzer
CPT, CA
Adjutant

338th MID -- OPERATION DESERT STORM
PERSONNEL ROSTER

SSG	Emory T. Check	048-28-6138
SSG	Angel E. Chevrestt	129-32-3103
SGT	Kathryn T. Conti	024-58-3739
SSG	Wilfred M. Cote	029-28-9156
SPC	Wendy M. Daigle	390-82-3392
SGT	Kim F. Emerling	046-58-5826
SPC	Mary T. Finneran	011-54-9474
SGT	Gary J. Fraske	378-64-3246
SPC	Mark A. Geskey	375-78-2887
SFC	Raul Jiminez-Cintron	582-84-4398
SGT	Kenneth D. Malcolm	233-06-7740
SFC	Michael L. Marciello	033-38-1319
SSG	James W. Oppenheimer	205-30-6763
SGT	Harold Rannestad	126-28-2450
SFC	Stanley Shalett	033-26-0103

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
APO NEW YORK 09616-5000

AFKA-ACA-MP-CG 28 February 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, USARCENT, ATTN: G3/PSYOP

SUBJECT: Request For PSYOP Support

1. Request fifteen Tactical Loudspeaker (HB) Teams be attached or placed in Direct Support of the 800th MP BDE. These LS Teams should be capable of mounted and dismounted loudspeaker operations utilizing the LSS-40 man-pack loudspeaker system.

2. The 800th MP BDE currently has the responsibility for operating five Prisoner of War (PW) Camps with a combined potential capacity of 100,000 PW's. Due to the extremely large number of PW's being tranferred from Corps/Division PW Cages, it is essential that these HB Teams support my camps and the PW Pacification/Crowd Control efforts ongoing there.

3. Now that the ground phase of Operation DESERT STORM is drawing to a close, request that these HB resources be immediately allocated to support the mission of the 800th MP BDE as it shoulders the entire responsibility for these PW's and the U.S. Governments continuing committment to abide by the Geneva onventions.

4. Points of contact this headquarters are CPT Prescott/SSG Nuckles at OMM 03-899-7470.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Mary E. Pawloski

MARY E. PAWLOSKI
MAJ, AG
Adjutant

CF CDR, 4th POG(A)

APPENDIX B-2
TACTICAL LOUDSPEAKER TEAMS ATTACHED

9th POB Enlisted

RANK	NAME	POSITION
SGT	Francis R. McDonald	S4 NCO Command Section
SPC	Carl lerta	Team 3 MSQ-85B Operato
SSG	Gregory A. Pa mele	Team 2 and Team 5
SPC	Randel L. Olson	Team 5
SFC	Roger A. Travis	Team 3
SPC	Mark L. Singleton	Team 3
SPC	Myron S. George	Team 3
SPC	Bradley C. Layne	Team 3
SGT	Leon R. Gooden Jr.	Team 4
SPC	William T. Pyne	Team 4
SPC	Bradley W. Shumaker	Team 4
SPC	Mathew M. Decker	Team 5
SGT	Thomas L. Miller	Team 3
SGT	Edward Pekowski	Team 2
SSG	Steven L. Carney	Command Section
SGT	Micheal J. Pendergast	Command Section

245th POC Enlisted

RANK	NAME	POSITION
SFC	Gene Richardson	Team 2
SGT	Asa Pearson	Team 2
SGT	Ronald White	Team 2
SPC	Jose Casanova	Team 2
SPC	Shawn Parks	Team 2
SGT	John M. G eenlee	Team 5
SPC	Jon A. C tier	Team 5
SPC	Darrell L. McCoy	Team 5

19th POC Enlisted

RANK	NAME	POSITION
SGT	Walter K. Treichel	Team 4
SPC	Mark A. Shilts	Team 4
SPC	Krag E. Anderson	Team 4
SSG	Dana A. Widboom	Team 1
SGT	David L. Eastlund	Team 1
SGT	David S. Fillbrandt	Team 1

Appendix P

To Iraq for an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Assessment

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (PW)
APO NEW YORK 09616

AFFA-XCA-MP-OPS 28 March 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR Official Area Authorities

SUBJECT: EPW Screening

1. The Commander of the the 13th PSYOPS, LTC James P. Noll 473-50-5513, will visit the 14 MP Bde Corp holding area on behalf of this command, to assess the PSYOPS status of EPWs being held. Present CHA is at PU 469238.

2. Direct coordination with 14 MP Bde is authorized.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Mary E. Pawloski

MARY E. PAWLOSKI
MAJ, AG
Adjutant

Appendix Q


Effectiveness of Psyop in Desert Storm

REPORTED IN THE EPW SYSTEM....


	LAST 24 HOURS	CUMULATIVE
XVIII ABC		7785
VII CORPS		15044
MARCENT		19171
SOCCENT		
NAVCENT		
BRITISH		3895
FRENCH		1991
SUBTOTAL		47886
ARAB COMMAND		12196
TOTAL		60082

08 MAR 91 - D+50

RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS



ETHNIC DIVISIONS



GENERAL PSYOP / OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MISSIONS


A Report on composition of PW/CI populations to identify potential target audiences.

B Pre-test and post-test PSYOP products generated by other PSYOP units.

C Develop intelligence of PSYOP interest for dissemination to PSYOP users for campaigns and reference.

D Screen camps populations to identify those PW/CI willing to provide language or other skills.


PSYOP INFORMATION AND PRETEST / POSTTEST FLOW



OPERATION DESERT STORM

IMPACT OF US PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH 250 IRAQI PWS



13th PSYOP Bn (PW)

LEAFLETS

- 98% OF PW'S INTERVIEWED HAD SEEN LEAFLETS. MOST BELIEVED THE MESSAGE AND REPORTED THAT THEY WERE INFLUENCED BY THE LEAFLETS.
- "INVITATIONS" WERE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN "THREATS."
- ILLUSTRATIONS SHOWING SURRENDER PROCEDURES WERE MOST EFFECTIVE, PROBABLY DUE TO LOW LITERACY RATES.
- LEAFLETS GIVING CLEAR SURRENDER INSTRUCTIONS WERE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN APPEALS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS.
- MANY PW'S BELIEVED THAT HAVING MORE LEAFLETS SHOWED A MORE SINCERE DESIRE TO SURRENDER. NEARLY ALL PW'S CARRIED LEAFLETS DESPITE THREATS OF DEATH IF THEY WERE CAUGHT WITH THEM.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

LEAFLETS

- ✓ CARICATURES OF IRAQI SOLDIERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE PORTRAYING WEAKNESS, FEAR, OR OTHER NEGATIVE ACTIONS OR EMOTIONS TENDED TO INCREASE RESISTANCE.
- ✓ MANY PW'S INTERVIEWED HAD DIFFICULTY IDENTIFYING FLAGS, ESPECIALLY ON BLACK AND WHITE LEAFLETS. IN ADDITION, VERY FEW IRAQIS RECOGNIZED OR UNDERSTOOD THE JOINT FORCES SYMBOL.
- ✓ DUE TO PRE-HOSTILITIES LEAFLETS, MANY PW'S INSISTED THAT THEY HAD DEFECTED AND WERE THEREFORE "GUESTS" RATHER THAN PRISONERS OF WAR.
- ✓ U.S. UNIT SYMBOLS ON SURRENDER LEAFLETS TENDED TO DETRACT FROM OTHERWISE CLEAR MESSAGES.
- ✓ THE COLOR RED MEANS DANGER AND LEAFLETS WITH RED BORDERS WERE OFTEN AVOIDED AS A RESULT.

13th PSYOP Bn (PW)

OPERATION DESERT STORM

SPECIFIC LEAFLETS

- PLATE OF FRUIT LEAFLET MOST POPULAR BY FAR.
- THOUGHTS OF FAMILY LEAFLET ALSO VERY EFFECTIVE.
- B-52 LEAFLETS HELPED ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY.
- 16TH DIVISION B-52 LEAFLET HURT CREDIBILITY BECAUSE PW'S DID NOT KNOW 16TH DIVISION WAS IN KTO OR KNEW 16TH DIVISION WAS FAR AWAY FROM THEM.
- COFFIN ON CAR LEAFLET INFLUENCED SOME PW'S.
- SEVERAL PW'S INTERVIEWED DID NOT RECOGNIZE BOMB.
- NO PW'S INTERVIEWED RECOGNIZED SADDAM CARICATURE. WHEN TOLD IT WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN, MOST PW'S THOUGHT HIS GESTURES INDICATED HE WAS SURRENDERING PEACEFULLY.

13th PSYOP Bn (PW)

SPECIFIC LEAFLETS

- ✓ LEAFLET SHOWING IRAQI TANKS AND PLANE NEAR MOSQUE WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY THE PW'S INTERVIEWED.

- ✓ IRANIAN AIR FORCE LEAFLET WAS THE LEAST EFFECTIVE AND MOST CONFUSING LEAFLET OF ALL PRODUCTS POSTTESTED. NO PW'S RECOGNIZED IRANIAN FLAG OR UNDERSTOOD THE "X" OVER THE IRAQI FLAG. ALSO, IRAQI PILOTS USE KPH RATHER THAN KNOTS AND METERS FOR ALTITUDE RATHER THAN FEET.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

RADIO

- 4 OF 5 PW'S THAT HEARD RADIO BROADCASTS STATED THAT SURRENDER INSTRUCTIONS INFLUENCED THEIR DECISION TO DEFECT OR SURRENDER.

✓ ALL COMMANDERS FORBID OWNING OR LISTENING TO RADIOS.

- FEW COMMANDERS ENFORCED THE ORDER, AND EVEN FEWER IRAQI SOLDIERS OBEYED THE ORDER.

- VOICE OF THE GULF RATED AMONG THE MOST BELIEVABLE.

✓ BBC AND RADIO MONTE CARLO RATED MOST RELIABLE.

- 9 OF 10 PW'S INTERVIEWED STATED THAT RADIO BAGHDAD WAS NEITHER RELIABLE NOR BELIEVABLE.

13th PSYOP Bn (PW)

OPERATION DESERT STORM

LOUDSPEAKERS

- TWO WHOLE UNITS REPORTED SURRENDER DUE TO L/S APPEALS
- ALL SOURCES THAT HEARD SURRENDER APPEALS REPORTED CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MESSAGE.
- APPEALS WITH IRAQI ACCENT MOST BELIEVABLE.
- ✓ APPEALS WITH KUWAITI ACCENT RAISED SUSPICION.
- BROADCASTS FROM GROUND VEHICLES WERE CLEAREST.
- ✓ BROADCASTS FROM HELICOPTERS WERE UNCLEAR AT TIMES.
- SEVERAL SOURCES SAID L/S APPEALS WOULD HAVE HELPED THEM TO DECIDE AND EFFECT THE SURRENDER OF THEIR UNIT.

13th PSYOP Bn (PW)

Appendix R

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

After Action Report (AAR)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXA-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: TRAINING

4. TITLE: TRAINING, 13th PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: Although the JFKSWCS does incorporate a presentation concerning the mission and structure of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW/CI) into some of its courses, there is no other effort throughout the MOS producing PSYOP schools to formally instruct soldiers how PSYOP interfaces with EPW Camp operations.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. The critical importance of utilizing PSYOP in support of Military Police Enemy Prisoner of War Camp operations has been highlighted during Operation DESERT STORM. Approximately 70,000 EPW's were confined in four separate theater-level camps administered by the 800th MP Bde in support of ground operations during the conflict.

b. There were several key factors involved that required and increased the need for PSYOP support to the MP's.

(1) The only locations available to contain and isolate these thousands of EPW's were in very harsh desert conditions. All life support systems, supplies and barrier materials had to be moved long distances by the MP's who had very limited transportation assets. The majority of the camp construction was performed by the MP's as they had very little engineer support. These factors added up to very spartan living conditions for the EPW's as they arrived at the camps and increased the potential for disturbances by the EPW's.

(2) The 800th MP Bde is a EUCOM oriented asset and all of its previous training and experience is in that theater. The 800th MP Bde performed a difficult task in an excellent fashion but without being able to rely on its own linguist-trained personnel to communicate with the EPW's, and without any experience with and very little knowledge of the EPW's different culture and customs. These factors also increased the possibility of disturbances by the EPW's through misunderstandings with the MP's.

(3) The vast quantities of EPW's being delivered to the camps with little or no notice 24 hours per day, with limited MP assets for EPW processing, caused lengthy delays entailing EPW discomfort and increased possibilities for disturbances.

(4) The presence of observers from various international agencies and the media was a cause for concern in that the treatment provided for the EPW's be reported by them as safe, healthy and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. From this point alone, it was vitally important to the strategic and operational level PSYOP campaigns that the living conditions in the camps be reported as good so Iraqi soldiers in the field would continue to surrender. And that the perceived treatment of these Arab EPW's by American MP's be positively reported to the regional Arab nations as in the best interest of the United States.

(5) Feedback derived from interviews/interrogations of the EPW's on the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP proved to be a valuable method of making continuous improvements in PSYOP products and their development.

(6) Identification of EPW's willing to cooperate and assist in making audio surrender appeals for use on the 'Voice of the Gulf' and in Tactical Loudspeaker Operations.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The reasons for providing PSYOP support to MP EPW Camp Operations remained valid during Operation DESERT STORM and increased in importance.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: JFKSWCS should increase the amount of instructional material contained within the POI's of their various courses concerning PSYOP in support of MP EPW Camp Operations. Specific subjects to be covered are crowd control by Tactical Loudspeaker Teams within EPW Camps, face-to-face PSYOP with EPW's, and interview/interrogation cross-training for 96F/39B soldiers.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: RESERVE COMPONENTS

4. TITLE: RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) ISSUES RELATING TO UTILIZATION OF THE 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: Army Reserve Component PSYOP detachments were used during the conflict to augment the Active Component (AC) PSYOP units of the 4th PSYOP Gp(Abn). Two types of RC PSYOP forces were used in this role: Tactical Loudspeaker (HB) Teams and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) PSYOP Support Camp Teams.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. RC HB Teams were fully integrated into the AC PSYOP battalions providing PSYOP support to the maneuver unit commanders. There was very little difficulty in this due to the identical nature of the training, equipment, support and missions normally assigned to both AC and RC HB Teams.

b. EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams were not integrated into the AC PSYOP battalions. This was due to the total absence of soldiers within the AC battalions trained to provide and control this type of support. A portion of the 13th PSYOP Battalion(EPW) was activated under a derivative UIC to provide the required PSYOP support to four large scale EPW Camps administered by the 800th MP Bde and the Marine Central Command.

c. The 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) is the only unit in both the AC and RC Army specifically organized to provide PSYOP support to EPW Camp operations. The mission of the 13th BN(EPW) is threefold: to assist the MP's in crowd control and advise them on the psychological impacts of their actions; to conduct pre-test and post-test on PSYOP products to determine the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP on target audiences by using EPW's as subjects; and to gain information from the EPW's to be used for further product development and continuing psychological operations.

d. The derivative UIC activating the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) limited the number of personnel to a total of thirty-two soldiers for deployment. All soldiers were 39B/96F/97E oriented and qualified. No provisions were made for administrative, supply, maintenance, communications, print or logistical support to be included in the derivative UIC as organic elements of the deployed force. Neither the 800th MP Bde or the 4th POG(A) were able to adequately provide the support necessary to sustain the battalion in all of the above categories.

e. The number of personnel assigned to each EPW PSYOP Support Camp Team was necessarily limited to a total of five soldiers in order to deploy five of these teams and still field a small essential soldier CI element. In this CI element, the S2 section was limited to one soldier and the S3 section was limited to two soldiers. Under the imposed personnel ceiling, the S1 and S4 sections could not be assigned any

soldiers and these two primary staff positions had to be addressed as additional duties. Neither the EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams or the C3 element was adequately staffed for long-term continuous 24 hour operations. After the execution of the ground campaign, this personnel shortfall was partially remedied by the temporary attachment of twenty 96F HB team members from the 4th POG(A) assisting in crowd control/face-to-face PSYOP and fifteen 97E soldiers from the 338th MI Detachment assisting in both EPW interrogations and battalion staff responsibilities.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The resources of any unit are finite and the priority of allocation is always in support of the parent unit's primary mission. The support required by attachments cannot always be adequately addressed. The partial activation of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) using a derivative UIC did not provide a logistical or administrative support base organic to the battalion. Full activation of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) is an absolute necessity if the unique nature of the unit's mission is taken into account. No other unit within the PSYOP community is required to support major MP EPW operations in widely separated geographical areas where absolute control of 70,000 EPW's is essential.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Full activation of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) in any future operation where the establishment of large scale EPW Camps is planned.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS

4. TITLE: OPERATIONS INVOLVING MSQ-85B SUPPORT TO THE 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: During the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) support of the four EPW Camps operated by the 800th MP Bde, two MSQ-85B's were employed by the battalion to provide PSYOP support in a pacification role. One of the MSQ-85B's was deployed by the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) (without a crew as per direction of the 8th POTF CDR) from Home Station and the other was attached (with crew) by the 4th POG(A) from the 9th POB(A).

6. DISCUSSION:

a. The primary mission of these MSQ-85B's was to assist in a pacification role regarding the EPW's within the various enclosures and processing areas. Pacification assistance provided by the MSQ-85B's ranged from broadcasting 'live' transmissions of PSYOP news and music from the 'Voice of the Gulf' to large screen projections of video movies to enclosures with EPW's who cooperated with the MP's and withdrawing this privilege from those who did not.

b. The secondary mission that these MSQ-85B's performed was the recording and duplication of broadcasts from the 'Voice of the Gulf.' Additionally, these teams recorded and edited audio surrender appeals by cooperative EPW's prior to forwarding these recordings to the 4th POG(A) for screening and use. Because of the soundproofing aspects, the MSQ proved invaluable for recording surrender appeals.

c. An additional mission that these MSQ-85B's performed was to provide assistance to the PSYOP Camp teams in editing video documentation for training and historical purposes regarding the construction of the camp and the standard operating procedures used by the MP's and the role of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) as a force multiplier for the MP's.

7. LESSON LEARNED: MSQ-85B teams are assets needed by the EPW PSYOP Camp teams in order to provide the required support to large-scale MP EPW Camp Operations.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Change the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) TOE to authorize six to eight MSQ-85B's (equipment and teams).

9. COMMENTS: An additional study has been provided to JFKSWCS and the 4th POG(A) regarding recommended changes to the technical and operational performance of the MSQ.

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS

4. TITLE: OPERATIONS INVOLVING TACTICAL LOUDSPEAKER TEAM SUPPORT TO THE 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: During the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) support of the four EPW Camps operated by the 800th MP Bde, ten Tactical Loudspeaker (HB) Teams were attached to the battalion from the 4th POG(A) to assist in providing PSYOP support.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. The primary mission of these HB teams as a force multiplier to the EPW Camp commanders was to assist in the crowd control of the EPW's within the various enclosures and processing areas. Crowd control assistance provided by the HB teams ranged from quelling disturbances to broadcasting announcements for the camp commander and PSYOP news from the 'Voice of the Gulf.'

b. The secondary mission these HB teams performed was face-to-face PSYOP with the EPW's on a daily basis inside the enclosures. This type of PSYOP served several different functions such as: dispelling potentially disruptive rumors; identifying 'troublemakers'; identifying informal leaders; identifying officers who had concealed their rank; and identifying EPW's who were willing to cooperate in pre-test/post-test of PSYOP products and making audio recordings of surrender appeals.

c. All HB team members were qualified 96F soldiers and several were able to assist and gain experience in interviewing/interrogating EPW's on an individual basis to gain PSYOP relevant information.

d. Prior to the attachment of the HB teams and after their release for redeployment, the function of the HB teams was performed by members of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) Camp teams. These PSYOP Camp teams used loaned man-pack loudspeaker systems for dismounted operations inside EPW enclosures and modified M-1008 trucks to carry local-purchase mosque speaker sets, amplifiers, and generators mounted in the truck beds as a field expedient for mounted operations on the camp perimeters. The 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) is not authorized HB teams under its current TOE. But the equipment and personnel trained in its use proved to be invaluable in providing the PSYOP support required by the 800th MP Bde.

7. LESSON LEARNED: HB teams are assets needed by EPW PSYOP Camp teams in order to provide the required support to large-scale EPW Camp Operations.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Change the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) TOE to authorize HB teams, or assign two Tactical PSYOP Companies to the EPW PSYOP Support mission.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS

4. TITLE: OPERATIONS INVOLVING 13th PSYOP BN(EPW/CI) SUPPORT TO THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BDE.

5. OBSERVATION: During the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW/CI) support of the four EPW Camps operated by the 800th MP Bde, the battalion employed an Enemy Prisoner of War PSYOP Support Team in a DS relationship to each EPW Camp.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. The primary missions of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) in support of these four EPW Camps was to conduct a PSYOP EPW Pacification Campaign to keep the prisoners responsive to MP authority, act as a force multiplier for the MP's and to advise the MP camp commanders on the psychological impacts of their actions.

b. Each of the EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams was composed of five 39B, 96F, or 97E soldiers. In each team, either the team leader or NCOIC had worked with the 800th MP Bde on training exercises in the past and was knowledgeable of EPW Camp operations. Additionally, of these five soldiers assigned from the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW), one or more were qualified 97E Interrogators. Due to the EUCOM-orientation of the battalion, only one soldier from the unit had any language skills in Arabic.

c. The conduct of the PSYOP EPW Pacification Campaign was executed by using Man-pack Loudspeaker and mosque speaker systems to broadcast audio recordings of music and news from the PSYOP radio station "Voice of the Gulf," EPW Camp Rules, and Inprocessing Station instructions. Printed signs, posters, information sheets, and camp newspapers were also used in this campaign. The MSQ-85B was used to project big-screen entertainment videos as a means of gaining leverage on the EPW's by providing them with something they did not want to lose through misbehavior. All of the information presented to the prisoners had to be in Arabic and required translation or screening by qualified personnel prior to use.

d. Acting as a force multiplier for the MP's involved team members using loaned LSS-40 Man-pack Loudspeakers to assist the MP Guard companies in quelling disturbances, crowd control

and broadcasting announcements. Identifying EPW agitators, informal group leaders and officers attempting to conceal their rank were important tasks accomplished as well, through interrogation and/or direct observation.

e. The team members had unescorted, direct access to the EPW compounds, enclosures and individual EPW's or groups of such on a 24-hour basis. Face-to-face PSYOP was continuously conducted in this manner to dispel potentially disruptive rumors and investigate EPW complaints.

f. Advising MP Camp commanders on the psychological impacts of their actions proved to be of extreme importance in preventing misunderstandings and subsequent disturbances by the EPW's against the MP's. The differences in culture, custom, religious practices and dietary habits were of such magnitude that misunderstandings were not always avoidable but could be minimized by investigation and proper handling.

g. Numerous disturbances within the EPW Camps involving hundreds of prisoners were defused by the direct intervention of EPW PSYOP Camp Teams using the man-pack loudspeaker systems and face-to-face PSYOP in extremely high-pressure situations. Loss of life due to these sometimes violent confrontations was completely avoided due to the immediate action response of the PSYOP Camp teams on a 24-hour basis.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The mission of providing Direct Support PSYOP to EPW Camp Operations has been revalidated by Operation DESERT STORM. However, due to the battalion's EUCOM-only orientation, the unit was dependent on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian interpreters for much of the communication with the prisoners.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: The 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) should continue to provide Direct Support PSYOP to MP units responsible for operating large-scale EPW Camps. The unique mission of the battalion requires that the orientation of the unit be expanded to include not only EUCOM, but all other Theater Areas of Operations so as to provide for proper resourcing of language-qualified personnel.

9. COMMENTS: NONE.

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BATTALION(EPW/CI) S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: COMMAND AND CONTROL

4. TITLE: 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI) COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) PSYOP SUPPORT CAMP TEAMS

5. OBSERVATION: The 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) deployed five EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams and a battalion-level Command and Control Team in support of the 800th MP BDE(EPW), MARCENT Corps Cage and 4th PSYOP GP(Abn).

6. DISCUSSION:

a. A portion of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) was activated under a derivative Unit Identification Code (UIC) and deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

b. The Command and Control Team was composed of the BN CDR, CSM, S2, S3, OPS NCO and two LNO's for a total of seven personnel. The battalion was restricted (per activation order) from deploying with an XO, S1, S4, CE officer or any other administrative, communication or logistical support personnel.

c. The five EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams were each composed of a Camp TM LDR, ASST TM LDR, NCOIC and two NCO/enlisted PSYOP Specialist and/or Interrogators for a total of five personnel. Each of the 5 PSYOP Camp Teams were in Direct Support of a theater-level EPW Camp confining up to 20,000 thousand prisoners in a field location. Each of the EPW Camps were in a separate location and in several instances, located hundreds of KM from each other and the battalion headquarters.

d. Sufficient depth was lacking in the staff positions causing inadequate resourcing of the Command and Control Team for extended 24 hours operations. The shortfall in the S2 and S3 sections were a particular cause for concern from the standpoint of current operations and planning.

e. Due to several primary staff and support positions not being resourced, the primary staff officers, CSM, and LNO's who deployed had to also cover these areas as well, causing an all-around degradation in efficiency as the tempo of operations increased. Additionally, laundry service transport, mail handling drop-off/pick-up, Class A Agent, Purchasing Office, and clerical support for not only OPORD's, FRAGO's, SITREP's, PERSTAT's and LOGREP's but the flood of OER's/SEER's, awards and administrative actions necessary for redeployment were only a portion of the routine support requirements that were handled simultaneously with normal primary duties.

f. LNO Teams of two soldiers each would have provided continuous liaison to both of the major supported unit headquarters but with only one such officer available due to the partial unit activation and deployment, this was not possible. The LNO to the 800th MP BDE(EPW) was tasked also to fill the S4, Property Book and Purchasing Officer positions. The LNO originally planned for the 4th PSYOP GP(Abn) was not filled and was instead used to fill the Assistant S3, CE Officer and LNO positions to the five deployed EPW PSYOP Support Camp Teams.

g. Thirty-five days after the commencement of hostilities, one NCO and two enlisted personnel from the 338th MI Detachment were attached to the Command and Control Team which assisted in alleviating some of the critical personnel shortages outlined above.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The derivative UIC method of deploying a partially activated battalion in support of the 800th MP BDE(EPW) and 4th PSYOP GP(Abn) degraded to a certain extent the capabilities of the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW). The required TOE strength of the battalion would have been more appropriate in executing the battalion's wartime mission.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Any future operation requiring the unique type of PSYOP mission support that only the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW) provides should include a full unit activation and deployment.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: DOCTRINE

4. TITLE: SUPPORT OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE (CI) PROGRAMS BY THE 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: FM 33-1 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, dated July 1987 provides the current Army doctrine regarding PSYOP support to EPW/CI programs but provides only one page. While much of this doctrine remains valid, some changes have to be made from the lessons learned during this operation. Further expansion is necessary also.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. A major gap in existing doctrine regarding this program is PSYOP in support of Corps-level EPW cages. The Corps-level cages are the first major collection facilities available after Division collection points. The Corps Cages provide the first semi-perminant stopping point for EPW's after capture. The Corps Cages allow EPW PSYOP to support both tactical PSYOP below Corps level, and the overall EPW PSYOP mission.

b. As proven by the EPW PSYOP element at the MARCENT Cage, EPW PSYOP can support tactical operations by; providing to the Corps PSYOP liaison timely and immediate PSYOP-relevant information and intelligence for dissemination to tactical loudspeaker teams; producing surrender appeals for use by forward loudspeaker teams; and pretesting tactical PSYOP products for use at all levels in the Corps area of operations. Additionally, the prisoners coming into the Corps Cages provide immediate feedback on the effectiveness of those PSYOP products currently in use at all levels in the Corp area. As a semipermanent holding area of 24 to 48 hrs, the Corp Cages are unique in providing support to ongoing EPW PSYOP activities. The EPW PSYOP element at the Corp level acts as the first screening area for identifying cooperatives, English speakers, intelligence agents, and instigators. Once identified, these names are forwarded to the theater-level military police EPW camps where the prisoners can be exploited for control purposes by other EPW PSYOP teams as they arrive.

c. The Corps Cage affords the opportunity for EPW PSYOP to be implemented on the prisoners while they are most vulnerable immediatly after capture. Because of this, all EPW PSYOP missions listed in FM 33-1 are relevant to the Corps Cages and should be immediatly carried out in order to start indoctrinating EPW's.

7. LESSON LEARNED: As proven at the MARCENT Corps Cage, there is an immediate and critical need for the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW), and the PSYOP community to add EPW PSYOP support at Corp level to its current missions in order to increase the effectiveness of EPW PSYOP as a force multiplier.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

a. Doctrine should be changed to implement EPW PSYOP support activities at the Corps Cages.

b. Because of the dual EPW PSYOP missions of providing support to EPW Corps Cages and to large-scale permanent EPW Camps, the EPW PSYOP Support Corps Cage Team should be an element of an EPW PSYOP battalion.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)
SUBMITTED BY 13TH PSYOP BN S-3, CPT PRESCOTT

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: DOCTRINE

4. TITLE: SUPPORT OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE (CI) PROGRAMS BY THE 13TH PSYOP BN(EPW/CI)

5. OBSERVATION: FM 33-1 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, dated July 1987 provides the current Army doctrine regarding PSYOP support to EPW/CI programs but provides only one page. While much of this doctrine remains valid, some changes have to be made from the lessons learned during this operation. Further expansion is necessary also.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. A major gap in existing doctrine regarding this program is PSYOP in support of Corps-level EPW cages. The Corps-level cages are the first major collection facilities available after Division collection points. The Corps Cages provide the first semi-perminant stopping point for EPW's after capture. The Corps Cages allow EPW PSYOP to support both tactical PSYOP below Corps level, and the overall EPW PSYOP mission.

b. As proven by the EPW PSYOP element at the MARCENT Cage, EPW PSYOP can support tactical operations by; providing to the Corps PSYOP liaison timely and immediate PSYOP-relevant information and intelligence for dissemination to tactical loudspeaker teams; producing surrender appeals for use by forward loudspeaker teams; and pretesting tactical PSYOP products for use at all levels in the Corps area of operations. Additionally, the prisoners coming into the Corps Cages provide immediate feedback on the effectiveness of those PSYOP products currently in use at all levels in the Corp area. As a semipermanent holding area of 24 to 48 hrs, the Corp Cages are unique in providing support to ongoing EPW PSYOP activities. The EPW PSYOP element at the Corp level acts as the first screening area for identifying cooperatives, English speakers, intelligence agents, and instigators. Once identified, these names are forwarded to the theater-level military police EPW camps where the prisoners can be exploited for control purposes by other EPW PSYOP teams as they arrive.

c. The Corps Cage affords the opportunity for EPW PSYOP to be implemented on the prisoners while they are most vulnerable immediatly after capture. Because of this, all EPW PSYOP missions listed in FM 33-1 are relevant to the Corps Cages and should be immediatly carried out in order to start indoctrinating EPW's.

7. LESSON LEARNED: As proven at the MARCENT Corps Cage, there is an immediate and critical need for the 13th PSYOP BN(EPW), and the PSYOP community to add EPW PSYOP support at Corp level to its current missions in order to increase the effectiveness of EPW PSYOP as a force multiplier.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

a. Doctrine should be changed to implement EPW PSYOP support activities at the Corps Cages.

b. Because of the dual EPW PSYOP missions of providing support to EPW Corps Cages and to large-scale permanent EPW Camps, the EPW PSYOP Support Corps Cage Team should be an element of an EPW PSYOP battalion.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

4 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: OPERATIONS

4. TITLE: SPECIFIC TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF MSQ-85B PERFORMANCE, 13TH PSYOP BN(PW)

5. OBSERVATION: The 13th PSYOP BN(PW) used the MSQ-85B in support of PW Camp Operations. Under wartime field conditions several problems in the design and performance became apparent which hindered mission accomplishment.

6. DISCUSSION

a. Of the PW PSYOP Support Team assigned to operate the MSQ-85B, only one soldier had previous exposure to the equipment, which was limited to a 5 day orientation class.

b. The fact that the MSQ-85B can only be operated with its own towed generator was a limitation to mission support capabilities during the initial time period in which it was operated out of an urban area of 8 story apartment buildings. Later in the campaign, use of the system was limited due to its required positioning at a field bivuac site where troops supporting 24 hour operations were on recovery time. The noise factor of the 5KW generator was too great to permit operations as needed due to the concentration of personnel at these locations. Commercial power was available, but the MSQ was not issued to the battalion with commercial power input connections.

c. The additional equipment which is stored in the metal containers on the trailer was far too sensitive to dirt to be stored next to the diesel generator. In the desert of Saudi Arabia it did not take long for dust to combine with diesel fumes, to create a situation where equipment could not be kept in operating condition.

d. The radio provided for taping broadcasts was not able to receive distant stations as needed. The VCRS used for editing can only play the NTSC 4.48 signal. Much of the material that came to us was filmed on systems we could not mix or copy.

e. The main power cable was not long enough to permit the generator to be placed far enough away so as to reduce noise levels to the affected audience.

f. The amount of equipment organic to the MSQ-85B system is too

bulky for the space available, resulting in accidental damage and breakdown.

g. The large movie screen collapses under windy conditions, a feature which would normally be desirable, however not when the screen is surrounded by concertina wire in an EPW enclosure.

h. Dust control inside the shelter was a significant problem.

i. Lack of a leak proof container for storing of special lubricants was a problem.

7. LESSON LEARNED: Under war-time field conditions the MSQ-85B could not be maintained in a clean enough condition to meet operating requirements. Two of the VCR's provided as component parts to the system were incapable of operating VHS tape format using the PAL or SECAM standards. The crew was tasked with working on VCR tapes which were produced with "PAL" or "SECAM" system camcorders. The crew had no capability to run those tapes through the mixer. The MSQ-85B was in an area where radio reception was poor, and was tasked with producing audio tapes from selected stations. The radio receiver issued as part of the system was not sensitive enough to receive designated stations. Once operations began in the desert, the generator trailer soon became coated with oil and dust. The projection screens are stored in metal containers on the generator trailer. It was only a matter of a short time before these screens became soiled. Dust and oil contamination to the projection screens must be controlled.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

a. Ensure sufficient training is provided to operators.

b. Add commercial power input connections.

c. Use a larger prime vehicle and store screens on prime mover.

d. Supply a better radio receiver. Supply "Multi-System" capable VCR's.

e. Supply an additional length of power cable from the generator to the shelter unit.

f. Use a larger prime vehicle with better shocks instead of the M-1008.

g. Supply a system of fasteners.

h. Supply a compact, industrial-strength vacuum cleaner.

i. Add a sealable, leakproof container for lubricants.

9. Comments: The problems described above can be corrected with only minor adjustments to what is basically an excellent piece of equipment. A Performance Review Board [illegible] may be formed to incorporate

needed improvement to the MSQ-85B system in light of Operation DESERT STORM as an interim "fix" to those future systems yet to be

manufactured. Request the primary operators of the MSQ-85B during Operation DESERT STORM be contacted, and that their input of suggested improvements be utilized from their individual experiences learned. The standard name lines and units are listed.

CHRIST, Gerhard R	SFC	504-36-1538	13th PSYOP BN(PW)
TAYLOR, Ernest K Jr.	SSG	246-88-1427	13th PSYOP BN(PW)
TRAVIS, Roger A	SFC	567-08-1767	9th PSYOP BN(Abn)
MILLER, Thomas L	SGT	215-08-3167	9th PSYOP BN(Abn)
ALERTA, Carl	SPC	586-66-0945	9th PSYOP BN(Abn)

2 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: DEPLOYMENT

4. TITLE: DEPLOYMENT OF 13TH PSYOP BN(PW)

5. OBSERVATION: The 13th PSYOP Bn(PW) was restricted from deploying with trucks larger then M-1008/1009 from CONUS.

6. DISCUSSION: The restriction placed on the 13th PSYOP BN(PW) which prevented the deployment of organic 2 1/2 ton/5 ton trucks greatly hindered the transport of both troops and equipment to field site locations. The supported unit (800th MP Bde) did not deploy with its own organic transport assets and was only able to acquire enough for its own purposes in Saudi Arabia.

7. LESSON LEARNED: Any future plans involving 13th PSYOP Bn(PW) support to several widely separated PW Camps must include the deployment of organic 2 1/2 ton/5 ton trucks with drivers in support of PW PSYOP Camp Teams.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Deploy 2 1/2 ton/5 ton trucks with drivers to meet the transportation requirements of moving PW Camps Teams to field sites and additional displacements as required.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

31 MAR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: COMMUNICATIONS

4. TITLE: COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE 13TH PSYOP BN(PW)

5. OBSERVATION: Communications with the PW PSYOP Support Camp Teams was a constant priority for the battalion. The unit exhausted every available method and asset in order to establish effective and reliable communications.

6. DISCUSSION:

a. High frequency radios were received from the Propaganda Dissemination Battalion (PDB) and were issued to the PW PSYOP Support Camp Teams. The low profile HF antennas that were issued with the radios were discovered to be unreliable in sandy surface conditions without extensive modification in set-up (i.e.,' large amounts of water poured on the sand to act as a reflector for the HF signal to bounce off of).

b. Assistance was requested from the CE officer of the PDB and he made several assistance visits to the PW camps where the PSYOP camp teams were located in order to correct this problem. It was determined that this problem was not correctable without different antennas. Due to this, the unit's ability to submit timely SITREP's and PSYOP-specific information was severely degraded.

7. LESSON LEARNED: High frequency radios are a viable and necessary form of communication in this type of environment. More effective types of antenna systems should be fielded in order to maintain a constant level of message traffic flow when using HF communications equipment.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

a. More training on the use, set-up, maintenance, propagation, and limitations of HF gear be addressed by all units who have the potential for using HF radio equipment.

b. HF radios should be issued with both the low profile and NVIS antenna systems. The NVIS antenna system does not require the need for large amounts of water spread on the ground in order to create a reflector for the signal to bounce off of. The NVIS antenna system can also be used effectively in the presence of groundwave jammers and direction finders. The operators should receive thorough instruction on the installation of both systems.

9. COMMENTS: High frequency radio communication is viable for this type of environment. With both antennas at the disposal of the operator, it is possible to use the system which works best in any area of operation. This would increase the effectiveness of HF radio communications and lessen confusion on the actual application of the systems.

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

31 MAR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: COMMUNICATIONS

4. TITLE: THE REQUIREMENT FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (SCE) IN THE 13TH PSYOP BN(PW)

5. OBSERVATION: The battalion was deployed without its authorized SCE equipment due to being zero balance on-hand in this category. Both the peace-time and war-time higher headquarters of the battalion were unable to fill these requests. The requests for SCE were valid because of the classified nature of the PSYOP information that was collected from the PW's. Much of this information was very time sensitive. The use of the MP distribution system to relay the relevant PSYOP information was the only secure means of communicating from this HQ to the camp teams.

6. DISCUSSION: When the need for SCE was addressed to the peace-time and war-time higher headquarters, no action or status of actions to obtain SCE were received at this HQ. After the need for SCE had ended, the battalion was issued a minimum number of KL-43's to transfer PSYOP relative information in a secure format.

7. LESSON LEARNED: SCE is a necessity at this unit. Without SCE, the battalion was forced to use the normal MP distribution channels to transfer PSYOP relevant information. This is and will continue to be a time consuming method of information transfer. Additionally, this channel was not available to the team in support of the MARCENT Corps Cage. Time sensitive material will loose its value without this type of equipment in use.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: The 4TH Group should assist in the issue of SCE to the 13TH PSYOP BN(PW) in order to facilitate the timely receipt of PSYOP-relevant data to their HQ.

9. COMMENTS: NONE

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

14 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: Logistics

4. TITLE: Transportation asset effects on the logistics for the 13th POB EPW mission.

5. OBSERVATION: Lack of transportation hampered the unit's ability to move personnel and equipment. Organic transportation for the advance party was not made available. The transportation assets that were scheduled were acceptable for a five man team.

6. DISCUSSION: The advance party was unable to function with any degree of effectiveness due to no organic transportation. The camp teams were unable to jump in one trip because the team trailers were shipped by sea and not with the unit. A civilian vehicle was not made available for over a week to the field ordering officer.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The teams must have all transportation assets in order to make an effective jump.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: All organic transportation must be made available to the unit. The advance party must have organic transportation on arrival in theater. Civilian vehicles must be made available to the field ordering officer and class "A" agent immediately upon arrival.

9. COMMENTS: N/A

10. (TO THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

14 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XYYXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: Logistics

4. TITLE: MTOE equipment needs of the 13th POB for their world wide systems.

5. OBSERVATION: The supply channels in theater were not equipped to handle the PSYOP equipment needs for the EPW mission. The electronic equipment that was organic to this unit was unable to run on ALL local current. The electronic equipment was not equipped with "plugs" that would work on the various systems in theater.

6. DISCUSSION: Requests for equipment were sent through the ARCENT contracting office. The contracting office was unable to purchase the required equipment on short notice. The field ordering officer and class "A" agent were instrumental in aquiring the mission essential equipment. ARCENT contracting did obtain equipment for this unit. However, equipment was not received in a timely manner and this impacted mission capability.

7. LESSON LEARNED: This units MTOE must be changed to reflect the mission essential requirements of an EPW mission. The electronic equipment must be updated to reflect the world wide mission of this unit.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: All camp teams must be outfitted with same equipment so all teams are interchangable. Organic electronic equipment must be able to operate on any current world wide, and any transmission world wide. The MTOE and/or LTOE must change to reflect the needs of the camp teams as reflected by the operation of the EPW camps in Operation Desert Storm.

9. COMMENTS: N/A

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

14 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: Logistics

4. TITLE: Supply assets and their effect on the EPW mission of the 13th POB.

5. OBSERVATION: The Battalion S-4 NCO was not allowed to accompany the 13th PSYOP BN on Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The S-4 officer was responsible for three full time duties and two extra duties, including those of the S-4 NCOIC.

6. DISCUSSION: The lack of supply personnel severly strained the battalion supply system. Due to not being allow to bring trained supply personnel, equipment was procured slower than it should have been. All supply requests and needs were answered on a slower pace. The S-4 officer "learned" the supply system in theater without the assistantance and knowledge of an S-4 NCOIC. This situation strained relations within all sections and teams as they prepared to deploy to the camp locations.

7. LESSON LEARNED: The unit must deploy with a knowledgable supply NCO.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: The unit must deploy with the entire logistics section, ie S-4 and company supply personnel.

9. COMMENTS: N/A

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)

14 APR 91

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. JULLS NUMBER: XXXXX-XXXXX (XXXXX)

2. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

3. KEYWORDS: Liaison

4. TITLE: Communications effect on the liaison officer/S-4 of the 13th POB and the accomplishment of the mission.

5. OBSERVATION: Lack of communications with the five (5) camp teams severly hindered this unit, the S-4, and liaison officer's ability to effectively coordinate mission requirements. This issue was constantly addressed by the S-3.

6. DISCUSSION: The liaison officer on camp team activities were a minimum two days behind because of poor communications. The lack of communications equipment hampered the resupply of PSYOP equipment. This was especially true concerning critical PSYOP equipment not available through EPW Camp supply channels.

7. LESSON LEARNED: Reliable voice communication is a must.

8. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Each team and command and control must have the ability to voice communicate with each other at all times.

9. COMMENTS: N/A

10. (10 THROUGH END OF REPORT TO BE COMPLETED BY JULLS SECTION)